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THE FUNDAMENTAL

GOAL OF ANTITRUST:

PROTECTING CONSUMERS, NOT
INCREASING EFFICIENCY
John B. Kirkwood* & Robert H. Landet
This article defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, analyzes recent case law in more depth than any priorarticle, and
explores the most likely bases for current popularsupport of the antitrust laws.
All thesefactors indicate that the ultimategoal of antitrustis not to increase the
total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives
them of the benefits of competition. When conduct presents a conflict between
protecting consumers and improving the efficiency of the economy (e.g., a
merger that raises prices but reduces costs), no court in recent years has chosen
efficiency over consumer protection.
The only exception is the law's determination to protect small sellers from
price fixing and other anticompetitive behavior by buyers. This limited concern, however, is just the mirror image of Congress' desire to protect consumers
from exploitation. In both buy-side and sell-side cases, the overarchinggoal is
the same-preventingfirms that have unfairly acquiredpowerfrom imposing
© 2008 John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande. Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or
below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author,
provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and
copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law; Adviser, American
Antitrust Institute; former Assistant Director for Evaluation, Federal Trade
Commission; J.D., Harvard University; M.P.P., Harvard University.
t Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; Director,
American Antitrust Institute; J.D., Harvard University; M.P.P., Harvard University.
The authors would like to thank Dennis Carlton for an excellent critique of an
earlier draft of this Article; Albert Foer, James May, and Robert Pitofsky for valuable
suggestions; and Joanna Diamond, David Goldfarb, Joey Pulver, and Elizabeth Weiler
for outstanding research assistance.
This Article updates and greatly expands the case law analysis in John B.
Kirkwood, Consumers, Economics, and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 1
(John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004). Much of this Article's legislative history analysis was
adapted from Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Originaland Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINcS L.J. 65 (1982).
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noncompetitive prices or other terms on their tradingpartners, thereby transferring wealth from the tradingpartners to themselves. This conclusion supports
a more aggressive approach to many areas of antitrust enforcement, including
mergers andjoint ventures.
INTRODUCTION

The conventional wisdom in the antitrust community today is
that the antitrust laws were passed to promote economic efficiency.
This view, held by most economists, conservative scholars, federal
enforcers, and practicing lawyers, is incorrect. Neither the sole nor
even the primary purpose of these laws is, or ever has been, to
enhance efficiency. Instead, as this Article demonstrates, the fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.
Both the legislative histories of the antitrust laws and recent cases
reveal this overarching purpose. Indeed, despite the appointment of
increasingly conservative Supreme CourtJustices and fourteen consecutive decisions for defendants,1 current Supreme Court opinions
focus much more on protecting consumers than on increasing efficiency. Like the overwhelming majority of recent lower court decisions that address the issue, these opinions indicate that the ultimate
purpose of the antitrust laws is to provide the benefits of competition
to consumers-lower prices, better products, and more choice-not
to improve the efficiency of the economy. The fundamental goal of
antitrust, in other words, is to protect consumers in the relevant market from anticompetitive behavior that exploits them-that unfairly
transfers their wealth to firms with market power-not to increase the
total wealth of society. When conduct presents a conflict between protecting consumers and promoting the efficiency of the economy (for
example, a merger that raises prices but reduces costs), the courts
2
have always chosen consumer protection over efficiency.
The only additional goal of mainstream antitrust law is the law's
determination to protect small sellers from price fixing and other
anticompetitive behavior by buyers. This additional goal is sharply
limited, however, because it applies only when antitrust enforcement
would not cause consumers to pay supracompetitive prices. At a
larger level, moreover, it is not a distinct goal at all: it is simply the
I

See Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Bookends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in Historical

Context, ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at 21, 22.

2 The view that consumer protection is the primary goal of the antitrust laws can
also be referred to as a "purchaser protection," "buyer protection," "wealth transfer,"
"consumer impact," "price to consumers," "purchaser property rights," or "distribufive" view.
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mirror image of Congress' desire to protect consumers from exploitation. In both sell-side and buy-side cases, in other words, the ultimate
goal is the same-preventing firms that have unfairly acquired power
from exploiting their trading partners, buyers or sellers. In short, the
goal is competitive prices (and other terms) for all.
The best known exponent of the contrary view is Robert Bork.
Recognizing that the antitrust laws cannot be properly interpreted
until their goals are determined, 3 he argued that the only permissible
objective of these laws is to enhance economic efficiency. 4 In his
famous article, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, Bork
appeared to demonstrate how the legislative history of the Sherman
Act established that when Congress debated and passed the Sherman
5
Act it had only one concern: increased economic efficiency.
Although Bork published his article in 1966, his followers in the
Chicago School gained significant control of the antitrust world only
3

Bork explained:
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm
answer to one question: What is the point of the law-what are its goals?
Everything else follows from the answer we give.... Only when the issue of
goals has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive

rules.
H. BOPR.K,

ROBERT

THE ANTITRUST PARADox

50 (1993).

4

See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
7, 44 (1966). Richard Posner relied upon Bork's analysis of the legislative history for his own assertion that only efficiency can play a role in antitrust. See RIcHARD
A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9-32 (2d ed. 2001). For other examples, see Lande, supra
note t, at 67-69. By performing a legislative history analysis Bork went far beyond
arguing that the best antitrust policy was one concerned only with efficiency. After
all, reasonable people could disagree over which policy was optimal. Bork sought to
trump what others thought of his efficiency-oriented policy view with his "strict constructionist" legislative history argument. The only question, he correctly maintained,
is what Congress cared about. By making a legislative history argument rather than a
"here is what is best" argument, Bork vastly raised the stakes. If he could freeze the
argument over the goals of the antitrust laws through an analysis of their legislative
histories, he would win the argument not just while the Chicago School was in power,
but for all time.
5 See Bork, supra note 4. Bork argued that if the legislative debates were analyzed closely, the then-common "populist" views of antitrust-including the belief that
the antitrust laws were passed to further a variety of social and political goals, such as
combating the political power of big business, or assisting small businesses-were not
a concern of Congress. See id. at 39-43. Bork asserted that even if social and political
values might have motivated Congress to act, when it came down to the actual operation of the antitrust laws, Congress cared only about increasing the efficiency of our
economy. See id. at 43-44. For a general discussion of the influence of Bork's analysis, see William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1413, 1437-39, 1445-51 (1990).
ECON.
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after President Reagan's 1980 election; control that grew during subsequent Republican Administrations. 6 Today, according to Judge
Richard Posner, virtually everyone involved in antitrust agrees that the
antitrust laws have a single objective-maximizing economic efficiency. 7 Judge Douglas Ginsburg recently came to a similar conclusion: "When Bork's article was first published in 1966, his thesis was
novel. By 1977, it had become the conventional wisdom of the federal
courts.... In emphasizing allocative efficiency over other values, the
Supreme Court implicitly endorsed Bork's thesis." 8 Similar statements have been made by all of the George W. Bush administration's
heads of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division,9 his first Chair of
6 Kovacic, supra note 5, at 1445 n.148, noted: "Reagan antitrust officials repeatedly embraced a single minded efficiency orientation." See also, e.g., Robert E.Taylor,
A Talk with Antitrust Chief William Baxter, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1982, at 28 (quoting
President Reagan's first Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for Antitrust, William Baxter: "The sole goal of antitrust is economic efficiency"). Likewise, an AAG for Antitrust in the first Bush administration recently proclaimed:
[Twenty years ago] the only ones who refused to recognize this [efficiency]
consensus were cranks and fuzzy thinkers on the fringe who were hostile to
the cold efficiency of the market ....
• . . Regardless of the label, the 1980s concept of . . . total sur-

plus . . .seems clearly to be the better animator of antitrust policy than
today's "wolf-in-sheep's-clothing" version (which is really consumer surplus).
It is impossible for me to discern any plausible benefit to interpreting the
antitrust laws in a way that ignores productive efficiency whenever it serves to
increase producer (as opposed to consumer) surplus.
Charles F. Rule, Consumer Welfare, Efficiencies, and Mergers: Statement for the
Hearing of the Antitrust Modernization Commission "Treatment of Efficiencies in
Merger Enforcement" 5-6 (Nov. 17, 2005), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commissionhearings/pdf/Statement-Rule.pdf.
7 See POSNER, supra note 4, at ix ("Almost everyone professionally involved in
antitrust today-whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed
observer . ..agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote
economic welfare ....").By economic welfare, Posner means "the economist's concept of efficiency." Id. Posner further asserts that the "wealth-redistribution argument. . . has no implications for the content of antitrust policy." Id. at 24.
8 Douglas H. Ginsburg, An Introductionto Bork (1966), 2 COMPETITION POL'Y Ir'L
225, 227-28 (2006).
9 The current AAG for Antitrust, Thomas Barnett, said that the "[Supreme]
Court has accepted the focus on economic efficiency and the use of economic analysis. Many of the recent decisions reflect no more than an application of these principles to outdated antitrust doctrines." Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Luncheon Address to the Federalist Society: Antitrust Update:
Supreme Court Decisions, Global Developments, and Recent Enforcement 2 (Feb. 29,
2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/230627.pdf.
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the Federal Trade Commission,' 0 and also by the ABA Antitrust Section."I In an article contrasting the Chicago and Harvard Schools of
antitrust, current FIC Chair William Kovacic restated the general
view: "Both schools generally embrace an economic efficiency orientation that emphasizes reliance on economic theory in the formulation
12
of antitrust rules."'

The Bush administration's second AAG for Antitrust, R. Hewitt Pate, similarly
observed: "'[T]he perfect [balancing] test in theory would of course be one that consistently and accurately condemned all, but only, that conduct which leads to a net
decrease in economic welfare."' Edward D. Cavanagh, Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler
Approach to Dominant Firms Under the Antitrust Laws?, 59 ME. L. REv. 111, 123 n.120
(2007) (quoting R. Hewitt Pate, Testimony Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing Panel: Exclusionary Conduct: Refusals to Deal and Bundling and
Loyalty Discounts 8 (Sept. 29, 2005), availableat http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
commissionhearings/pdf/PateStatement.pdf).
In a major speech to the OECD, the Bush Administration's first AAG for Antitrust, Charles James, mentioned only one concern-efficiency. See Charles A. James,
Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks Before the OECD Global Forum
on Competition: International Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence 7 (Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
9330.pdf.
10 The Bush administration's first FTC Chair, TimothyJ. Muris, wrote that efficiency enhancing mergers should be approved even if they resulted in higher consumer prices. See Timothy J. Muris, The Government and MergerEfficiencies: Still Hostile
After All These Years, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 729, 733 (1999) ("Another beneficial
change in the 1997 Revised Merger Guidelines is the rejection of a rigid requirement
that cost savings must be 'passed on' to consumers."). This is consistent with his earlier article on the subject, which explicitly rejected all consideration of wealth transfer
effects on consumers. See TimothyJ. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381, 393-402 (1980) [hereinafter Muris, Efficiency

Defense].
11 See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST POLICY
OBJECTIVES 4 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/
2003/reports/policyobjectives.pdf ("[O]ver time, the evolution of constitutional and
economic theories and their perceived importance to antitrust review in combination
with political, social and economic events, have led U.S. courts and antitrust agencies
to adopt the current, more efficiencies-oriented, understanding of U.S. antitrust policy objectives as part of their interpretation and enforcement of federal antitrust legislation."); id. at 26-27 ("The promotion of competition in terms of efficiencies is the
antitrust objective best suited to incorporating economic analysis within a competition review and, accordingly, is a fundamental and necessary competition law objective."). Although this document criticizes other possible antitrust objectives,
including protecting small business and promoting national champions, it virtually
ignores the wealth transfer effects of market power.
12 William E. Kovacic, The IntellectualDNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/HarvardDouble Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 35.
Kovacic also quotes Professor Jacobs' description of the prevailing view:
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The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is wrong. The Chicago School's efficiency view is not
only incorrect on the merits; it has not triumphed in the courts. The
primary goal of antitrust is to protect consumers from paying higher
prices to firms that have unfairly gained or maintained market power.
The antitrust laws, in other words, can be explained as a congressional
declaration that the property right we today call "consumers' surplus" 1 3 belongs to consumers, 1 4 not to cartels. While this certainly

does involve the use of economic analysis, it is not efficiency analysis.
Rather, the antitrust laws primarily were enacted to award this property right to purchasers of goods and services, and to prevent cartels
15
and unjustified monopolies from taking it.
The ultimate objective

of these laws, in short, is to protect consumers, not to increase overall
efficiency.
This Article will define these concepts more precisely. It will then
demonstrate that consumer protection was the primary reason for the
passage of the antitrust laws, and is a far more plausible explanation
than the efficiency goal. The only additional goal is the complementary and sharply limited concern for small business welfare in those
few circumstances where this will not lead to supracompetitive prices.
The third Part analyzes the treatment of these issues in recent
cases. It shows that Supreme Court and lower court opinions gener"Despite their differences, post-Chicago and Chicago scholars share a common metric. They agree that wealth maximization should be the exclusive
goal of antirust policy, and antitrust enforcement should strive to achieve
the highest practicable level of consumer welfare. They eschew the multivalent inquiries informing the Modern Populists' approach in favor of the single-minded pursuit of allocative efficiency."
Id. at 24 n.67 (quoting Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of
Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 242 (1995)).
Likewise, Kovacic concludes that "it is difficult to identify over the past twenty
years enforcement actions that the FTC or the Justice Department predicated upon
the achievement of goals other than the enhancement of economic efficiency." William E.Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 464 (2003).
13 "Consumers' surplus" is the difference between what something is worth to
consumers and the price they pay for it. See Lufs M.B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

16 (2000).

14 Unless noted otherwise, we use the term "consumers" to include all individual
or business purchasers of products and services, regardless whether they are the ultimate end users. For the legislative and policy basis of this definition, see infra notes
45-47 and accompanying text.
15 Put differently, the antitrust laws define certain private property rights and protect them from being stolen by firms that have acquired market power without
justification.
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ally exhibit much more concern with protecting consumers than with
enhancing efficiency. It also describes the courts' parallel determination to protect small sellers from exploitation. The fourth Part concludes that most voters today likely support antitrust enforcement not
because it improves the efficiency of the economy, but because it protects them from higher prices. The final Part identifies the areas of
antitrust law where the adoption of a consumer protection approach
is likely to lead to more aggressive enforcement than an exclusive
focus on efficiency.
I.

DEFINITIONS: "CONSUMER WELFARE," THE WELFARE OF CONSUMERS,
AND EFFICIENCY

Since the critical terms in this area are sometimes used inconsistently, we begin by defining these concepts. The following standard
diagram shows the economic effects of monopoly or cartel power.
Monopolies and cartels usually raise prices above the competitive
level. In economic terms this produces allocative inefficiency 16 (the
"deadweight welfare loss"), represented by the triangle in the following diagram, 17 and also a taking of consumers' wealth by the monopoly or cartel, represented by the rectangle 18 :
16 Supracompetitive pricing not only forces consumers to pay more. It also
causes a form of economic inefficiency called allocative inefficiency:
To raise prices a monopoly reduces output from the competitive level.
The goods no longer sold are worth more to would-be purchasers than they
would cost society to produce. This foregone production of goods worth
more than their cost is pure social loss and constitutes the "allocative inefficiency" of monopoly. For example, suppose that widgets cost $1.00 in a
competitive market (their cost of production plus a competitive profit).
Suppose a monopolist would sell them for $2.00. A potential purchaser who
would have been willing to pay up to $1.50 will not purchase at the $2.00
level. Since a competitive market would have sold [the] widgets for less than
they were worth to him, the monopolist's reduced production has decreased
the consumer's satisfaction without producing any countervailing benefits
for anyone. This pure loss is termed "allocative inefficiency." For an
extended discussion and formal proof that monopoly pricing creates allocative inefficiency, see E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 277-92 (4th ed. 1982).
Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33
ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 433 n.17 (1988).
17 For a more detailed explanation of this diagram, see BORK, supra note 3, at
107-15.
18 Id. The price increase transfers the "consumers' surplus" in this rectangle to
the monopoly or cartel. For the definition of "consumers' surplus," see supra note 13.
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These concepts are crucial because Judge Bork developed via a
lengthy, heavily footnoted text the argument that the original framers
of the Sherman Act had a single intent: to enhance economic efficiency. Bork argued that "[t]he whole task of antitrust can be
summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without
impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain
or a net loss in consumer welfare."1' 9 Bork explicitly rejected distributive issues as a possible area of congressional concern: "[I] t seems
clear the income distribution effects of economic activity should be
completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust legality
of the activity. It may be sufficient to note that the shift in income
distribution does not lessen total wealth . "..."20
Bork pointed to dozens of statements revealing an overriding
congressional concern that trusts and certain other business forms
would acquire monopoly (or market) power that would give them the
ability to artificially raise prices and restrict output. 21 Bork wove these
quotations into a convincing case that this concern preoccupied Congress. 22 He then used modern economic analysis to explain how
monopoly power leading to higher prices for consumers can produce
that form of economic inefficiency we today call "allocative ineffi19 BORK, supra note 3, at 91.
20 Id. at 111. Bork also rejected other possible congressional concerns, such as a
concern with small business welfare. Id. For excellent summaries of the arguments
regarding the wisdom of a large number of possible antitrust goals, see John J. Flynn,
AntitrustJurisprudence:A Symposium on the Economic, Politicaland Social Goals of Antitrust
Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1977); Symposium, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on

Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965). For the history of this debate, see Harlan M.
Blake & William K Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 377-82
(1965).
21

Bork, supra note 4, 12-21.

22

See id.
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ciency. '' 23 Bork reasoned that since we now know that the "only"
harm to "consumer welfare" from higher prices is economic inefficiency, congressional displeasure with market power can fairly be
equated with a concern about economic efficiency. 24

He then

presented a smaller, although still significant, number of quotations
that manifest a congressional desire to preserve and enhance corporate productive efficiency. 25 On the basis of this evidence, Bork con-

cluded that the antitrust laws embody only a concern for "consumer
welfare" which he equated with the "maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction" 26 and the aggregate efficiency of our
economy.

27

Notice the subtle yet crucial change in terminology. Bork used
"consumer welfare" as an Orwellian term of art that has little or nothing to do with the welfare of true consumers. His desire to maximize
"consumer welfare" (which he defines as economic efficiency) carries
with it no concern about the wealth extracted from consumers and
transferred to firms with market power as a result of the higher prices
that arise from cartel or other prohibited behavior. Bork thus defined
"consumers" to include monopolists and cartels! 28 Antitrust based on
his definition of "consumer welfare" makes no distinction between
"real" consumers-the purchasers of goods and services-and the
firms with market power that raise prices and thereby extract wealth
from purchasers. Higher prices to consumers are fine with Bork so
long as the monopolist or the cartel produces more efficiently. In
fact, the "consumers" who principally benefit under Bork's regime are
monopolists and cartels. 29 If he had been honest, Bork would have
23 See BoRK, supra note 3, at 98-101.
24 Bork also argued that only an efficiency orientation was administrable. He
made a convincing case that even if there were any doubt as to congressional intenthe, of course, had none-the antitrust laws should be construed in an administrable
manner. Since a social-political framework was so amorphous, he argued, administrability concerns also militated that the antitrust laws should be interpreted solely as
a means of increasing economic efficiency. Indeed, Bork even pronounced all contrary views as being so incapable of predictable and administrable use as to be "unconstitutional." Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST
L.J. 21, 24 (1985).
25 See Bork, supra note 4, at 26-31.
26 Id. at 7.
27 BoRK, supra note 3, at 91.
28 We are indebted to Professor Steven Salop for this and related articulations of
this concept.
29 Under Bork's definition, "consumer welfare" is improved when economic efficiency is increased even if consumers in the relevant market are harmed. Technically,
Bork can make this claim because the owners of monopolies and cartels are also consumers. Indeed, in the classic tradeoff situation, they are the "consumers" who princi-
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used "total welfare" as the synonym for economic efficiency, the term
30
employed by the economics profession for this purpose.
Another crucial distinction is between the transfer of this consumers' surplus from purchasers to firms with market power, and the
overall distribution of wealth in society.
To contrast the two, suppose a thief were to rob a Chicago School
economist. If we asked the economist whether he or she objected to
this robbery, that economist would surely reply that they did object,
because stealing is inefficient.
The economist would be right insofar as stealing is inefficient.
But, does society condemn stealing solely or even primarily because of
its inefficiency effects? Isn't the principle reason society condemns
stealing because it constitutes a taking of property without consent
and without compensation? Stealing is an unfair transfer of wealth. A
thief has no right to take the economist's money, and this is the reason why it is-and should be-illegal.
Moreover, we have no idea whether our hypothetical thief is
more or less wealthy than our hypothetical economist. We have no
idea what this theft would do to the distribution of wealth in our economy. Their respective wealth, however, is not connected to our decision to make theft illegal. It should be no defense to a charge of
stealing for the robber to argue that he or she is poorer than the victim. We are not, and should not be, allowed to steal just because this
might help even out the distribution of wealth. Stealing is an unfair
taking of property, an unfair transfer of wealth. The law properly
31
focuses on the taking, not the distribution of wealth.
pally benefit from a merger that raises price but increases efficiency. (Consumers in
other markets may also benefit if the merger lowers costs, because that frees up
resources for use in other markets, which will increase supply in those markets and
may lower prices.) However, those who purchase from the merged firm-the consumers that Congress wanted to protect-are substantially worse off. They gain none
of the efficiency benefits, absorb some of the allocative inefficiency losses, and have
their surplus extracted by the firms with market power.
30 Many commentators have pointed out that Bork's terminology was confusing
or misleading because economic efficiency, as commonly measured, consists of the

sum of consumers' surplus and producers' surplus. The more accurate synonym for
economic efficiency is total welfare (or a variant such as aggregate welfare, total surplus, or wealth maximization). SeeJonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy As a Political
Bargain, 73 ANTrrRuST L.J. 483, 515 (2006); Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle,
Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger Standards of the United States, Canada,and the European
Union, 72 AT-rrrausT L.J. 423, 430-32 (2005); Kirkwood, supra note t, at 47 n.ll.
31 For an analysis of a Canadian case that incorrectly blurred this distinction, see
infra note 171; see also Alan A. Fisher et al., Legalizing Merger to Monopoly and Higher
Prices: The Canadian Competition Tribunal Gets It Wrong, ANTiTRusr, Fall 2000, at 71
(analyzing wealth transfer and welfare in the context of the Canadian merger case).
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In antitrust terms, if poor owners of yacht-making companies
somehow formed an effective yacht cartel and raised the prices that
millionaires paid for yachts, this cartel would violate the antitrust laws.
The judge should not listen to the cartelists' argument that they were
poorer than their victims.
For these reasons, the remainder of this Article will focus on the
transfer of wealth caused by market power, not the distribution of
wealth. The next Part will show that these transfers are the primary
reason why the antitrust laws were enacted.
II.

A.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

An Overriding Concern with Protecting Consumers'Propertyfrom Being
Stolen, Not with Efficiency

Which explanation for the passage of the antitrust laws is more
likely32 : enhancing economic efficiency, or preventing firms that have
unfairly acquired or maintained market power from charging consumers supracompetitive prices?
The legislative history of the Sherman Act, 33 for example, contains many statements of concern by Senator Sherman 34 and other
legislators3 5 that some of the trusts and other businesses of the period
had enough power-what we today would call market power-to raise
prices. Judge Bork summarized this portion of the debates eloquently: "The touchstone of illegality is raising prices to consumers.
There were no exceptions. '3 6 Since we know of no serious disagree32 As Judge Bork noted, the task of ascertaining the will of Congress should be
"an attempt to construct the thing we call 'legislative intent' using conventional methods of collecting and reconciling the evidence provided by the Congressional
Record." Bork, supra note 4, at 7 n.2.
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). For similar statements from the legislative history of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006), see Lande, supra note t, at 128; for similar statements from the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18,
21 (2006), see Lande, supra note t, at 135-36; for similar statements from the legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006), see
Lande, supra note t, at 112-14.
34 See 21 CONG. REc. 2462 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (asking Congress
to protect the public from trusts that "restrain commerce, turn it from its natural
courses, increase the price of articles, and therefore diminish the amount of commerce"); id. at 2460 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (arguing that it is sometimes contended that trusts reduced prices to the consumer, "but all experience shows that this
saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer"); id. at 2457 (statement of Sen.
Sherman) ("[Trusts tend to] advance the price to the consumer.").
35 See, e.g., id. at 2558 (statement of Sen. Pugh) ("[T]rusts... [destroy] competition in production and thereby increas[e] prices to consumers .. .
36 Bork, supra note 4, at 16.
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ment that this was indeed the preoccupation of the debates we will
not discuss it further.
The key question, however, is precisely why Congress objected
when the trusts raised prices to consumers. As noted in the previous
Part, these higher prices cause two direct economic effects: the transfer of surplus from consumers to cartels, and allocative inefficiency.
Which one was Congress' concern? Or were both of concern?
Was Congress, in 1890, worried about the deadweight welfare loss
triangle? Or was their concern that higher prices caused an undesirable and unfair transfer of wealth from purchasers to firms with market power? Did Congress view cartels and monopolies that charged
higher prices as analogous to the hypothetical thief discussed in the
previous Part who stole money from the economist? The Sherman
Act's legislative debates make this clear.
For example, Senator Sherman termed the higher prices "extortion," 37 and "extorted wealth. '3 8 Others referred to the overcharges
as "robbery,"3 9 and a complaint was made that the trusts, "without rendering the slightest equivalent," have "stolen untold millions from the
people." 40 Another congressman complained that the beef trust "robs

41
the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other."
Another declared that the trusts were "impoverishing the people"
through "robbery."42 Another declared that monopolistic pricing was
"a transaction the only purpose of which is to extort from the community ...wealth which ought.., to be generally diffused over the whole
community." 4 3 Another complained: "They aggregate to themselves

great, enormous wealth by extortion ....,,44

Do terms like "stealing," "robbery," "extortion," and "stolen
wealth" sound like allocative inefficiency? Or is it more likely that
Congress in effect awarded the property right which we today call
"consumers' surplus" to consumers, and under the antitrust laws, the
taking of consumers' surplus by cartels constitutes theft?
Congress wanted to protect those who purchased products and
services; it made no distinction between wealthy and poor consumers,
37 21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (quoting Sen.
George).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2614 (statement of Rep. Coke).
40 Id. at 4101 (statement of Rep. Heard).
41 Id. at 4098 (statement of Rep. Taylor).
42 Id. at 4103 (statement of Rep. Fithian) (reading, With apparent approval, a
letter from a constituent).
43 Id. at 2728 (statement of Sen. Hoar).
44 Id. at 1768 (statement of Sen. George).
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or between business and individual consumers. Nor did Congress
seem concerned about the issue of who ultimately bore the cost of
monopoly overcharges (i.e., Congress did not seem concerned
whether purchasers absorbed the overcharges or passed them on).
Rather, Congress could see that prices to anyone who purchased from
a monopoly or cartel increased, and passed the antitrust laws to prevent this from happening. While Congress frequently referred to
"consumers," it did not appear to care only about ultimate consum45
ers. Instead, Congress wanted to protect all who were overcharged.
Thus, the best and most straightforward way to embrace Congress' concern for "consumers" would be to equate it to a concern
with the direct purchasers of goods and services sold by cartels,
monopolies, etc. In other words, any direct purchaser should be
deemed a "consumer" for antitrust purposes, regardless of what he or
she decided to do with the good or service purchased. 4 6 Otherwise
every price rise caused by a monopoly, cartel, etc. would have to be
examined to determine whether it had been absorbed by
intermediaries or whether, and to what degree, it had been passed on
to consumers. This can be a very difficult undertaking. 47 Firms that
otherwise would have violated the antitrust laws should not be
excused on the grounds that they "only" harmed business purchasers.
If there were any doubt about Congress' overriding desire to protect consumers, it is significant that in 1890 even economists were only
just becoming aware of the concept we today call "allocative ineffi45 A number of decisions explicitly refer to protecting buyers, purchasers or customers (not just consumers). For example, the Court noted in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983): "As the legislative
history shows, the Sherman Act was enacted to assure customers the benefits of price
competition." See also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
489 (1968) ("The reason is that he has paid more than he should and his property has
been illegally diminished, for had the price paid been lower his profits would have
been higher .... As long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes
from the buyer more than the law allows."); La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir.
2003) ("[T] he very purpose of antitrust law is to ensure that the benefits of competi-

tion flow to purchasers of goods affected by the violation.").
46 It would be a complicated, time-consuming, and useless task to attempt to
determine precisely what happened to each good and service sold by a cartel.
Depending upon the product, some would be consumed by direct purchasers, some
would be resold, and others would be incorporated into different products.
47 Many of the complexities that would arise if the standard were limited to the
welfare of ultimate consumers are analyzed in GregoryJ. Werden, Monopsony and the
Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light, 74

ANTITRUST

L.J. 707 (2007). These

problems can all be avoided, however, by focusing only upon the direct purchasers.
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ciency." 48 In fact, the allocative inefficiency triangle that modern
members of the antitrust community see so often (illustrated in Part I
above) never appeared in the 1890 edition of Alfred Marshall's
ground-breaking book Principles of Economics.4 9 Moreover, even if

economists were familiar with this concept, there is no evidence they
50
had any influence on the passage of the Sherman Act.

Even though Congress' main complaint about trusts-that they
were perceived to raise prices-did not equate to a concern for allocative inefficiency, could Congress primarily have been concerned with
corporate productive efficiency? Did Congress pass the Sherman Act
primarily to save costs and increase corporate productive efficiency?
For example, did Congress condemn Rockefeller because Standard
Oil was so inefficient? Were very many people in 1890 in effect saying,
"Curses on Rockefeller because he is so inefficient at producing oil!
His inefficiency is ruining our country!"
Whatever bad things might or might not have been true, or
believed to be true, about Rockefeller, we are not aware that he was
ever publicly accused of inefficiently running his oil company. 51 To
our knowledge he was never attacked for being inefficient. 52 Nor did
the government ever assert that Standard Oil should be deemed to
53
have violated the Sherman Act for being inefficient.

48 It was not until 1938 that the first modern and rigorous discussion of allocative
efficiency appeared. See Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of
Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938).
49 See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890). Although he devoted
seventeen pages of the 1890 edition of this landmark treatise to "The Theory of
Monopolies," only one footnote included even an arguable reference to the concept,
and the triangle we know so well today was not drawn anywhere in this book. See id. at
bk. V,ch. XIV.
50 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 200 (1965) ("The Sherman Act was framed and debated in the pre-expert era, when economists as a professional group were not directly consulted by legislators. But even if they had been,
they would have given mixed and uncertain advice.").
51 See, e.g., Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, MCCLURE'S
MAG., 1902-1904. See generally RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. (1998).
52 See CHERNOW, supra note 51.
53 For an excellent and thorough analysis of the Standard Oil case, see James May,
The Story of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, in ANTITRUST STORIES 7 (Eleanor M. Fox
& Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007). May analyzed, inter alia, over 1800 pages of briefs filed
by both parties and never found an attempt by the government to condemn the Standard Oil Company for being inefficient.
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Of course, the Congresses that enacted the Sherman Act, 54 FTC
Act, 55 Clayton Act, 5 6 and Celler-Kefauver Act 57 certainly did appreci54 See 21 CONG. REc. 2457, 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) ("[The bill]
does not in the least affect combinations in aid of production where there is free and
fair competition ....
It is sometimes said of these combinations [the monopolistic
trusts] that they reduce prices to the consumer by better methods of production, but
all experience shows that this saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer."); see
also id. at 2457 (statement of Sen. Sherman) ("Experience has shown that they are the
most useful agencies of modern civilization. They have enabled individuals to unite
to undertake enterprises only attempted in former times by powerful governments.
The good results of corporate power are shown in the vast development of our railroads and the enormous increase of business and production of all kinds.").
55 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006). For an example of Congress' appreciation of corporate efficiency, see 51 CONG. REc. 12,146 (1914) (statement of Sen. Hollis) ("Fair
competition is competition which is successful through superior efficiency. Competition is unfair when it resorts to methods which shut out competitors who, by reason of
their efficiency, might otherwise be able to continue in business and prosper. Without the use of unfair methods no corporation can grow beyond the limits imposed
upon it by the necessity of being as efficient as any competitor. The mere size of a
corporation which maintains its position solely through superior efficiency is ordinarily no menace to the public interest."); see also id. at 11,231 (statement of Sen. Robinson) ("Nearly all normal business men can distinguish between 'fair competition' and
'unfair competition.' Efficiency is generally regarded as the fundamental principle of
the former-efficiency in producing and in selling, while oppression or advantage
obtained by deception or some questionable means is the distinguishing characteristic of 'unfair competition."' (quoting William H.S. Stevens, a leading economist of
the times)); id. at 8854 (statement of Rep. Morgan) ("To enable us to secure all the
benefits and advantages of the large industrial unit and escape the evils and dangers
thereof.... To relieve doubt and uncertainty in business, develop trade, encourage
commerce, and promote enterprise."). Additional concern for efficiency can be
found in the earliest proceedings of the FTC, which noted its desire in making rulings
and orders "to promote business efficiency and, within the limits of practicability, to
cooperate with the business world in developing the best standards of commercial
ethics." 1916 FTC ANN. REP. 26.
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006). For an example of Congress' appreciation of corporate efficiency, see 51 CONG. REc. 14,223 (statement of Senator Thompson) ("The
chief purpose of antitrust legislation is for the protection of the public, to protect it
from extortion practiced by the trust, but at the same time not to take away from it
any advantages of cheapness or better service which honest, intelligent cooperation
may bring."). For other discussions of the legislative history, see Muris, Efficiency
Defense, supra note 10, at 393-402.
57 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2006). For an example of Congress' appreciation of corporate efficiency, see CorporateMerger and Acquisitions: Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before the
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59-61 (1949-1950) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) ("[The] main reason for antitrust laws is that we
believe the competitive system is more efficient than monopoly."); see also id. at 308
(statement ofJames L. Donnelly, Executive Vice President of the Illinois Manufacturers' Association) (expressing concern over the bill's "effect on prices, the effect on
productive efficiency").
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ate corporate efficiency. But they nevertheless passed the antitrust
laws that in so many ways attacked these efficient corporations. If all
they wanted was to encourage that form of industrial organization that
was most productively efficient they would have praised the trusts, not
condemned them in the legislative debates and enacted a law that
condemned their activities. Congress must have been concerned with
other goals.
This leaves the consumer protection explanation as being most
consistent with the evidence. Even without the legislative history quotations, 58 which explanation makes more sense: congressional anger
over perceived higher prices 59 meant Congress was concerned about
consumers paying more to monopolies and cartels? Or either of the
efficiency explanations (either congressional anger in 1890 because
higher prices caused allocative inefficiency, or congressional anger
because the Rockefellers of the day were inefficient at producing their
products) ?60
58 Since the legislative history is so clear, one might ask how the efficiency orientation could have gained so much ground. We present three possible, non-exclusive
explanations:
1. The presidency of President Reagan beginning in 1980 put into power enforcers and judges who were predisposed to accept the efficiency explanation.
2. The only available alternative to the efficiency model during the transition to
the Reagan administration was the big is bad/small is good, social/political model,
which was correctly perceived by decisionmakers as almost standardless and very difficult to administer in a predictable manner. See, e.g.,
Bork, supra note 4, at 9. By
contrast, the transfer approach is just as easy to administer, and just as predictable, as
the efficiency model. See Alan A. Fisher et al., Afterword: Could a Merger Lead to Both a
Monopoly and a Lower Price?, 71 CAL. L. REV.1697, 1705-06 (1983) [hereinafter Fisher
et al., Afterword]; Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerationsin Merger
Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1580, 1684-91 (1983); Alan A. Fisher et al., PriceEffects of
Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777, 809-18 (1989) [hereinafter Fisher et al., Horizontal Mergers]. This model was not, however, available during the dawn of the Reagan administration, so it perhaps was natural that the decisionmakers instead opted
for the model that economists were using-economic efficiency.
3. Confusion over the term "consumer welfare." Bork's extremely influential
work advocated maximizing "consumer welfare," a seemingly pro-consumer objective.
However, he defined the term so that it included a concern with the welfare of
monopolies and cartels; prices could rise and "consumer welfare" could still increase.
His deceptive use of the term "consumer welfare," instead of the more honest term
"total welfare," was a brilliant way to market the efficiency objective. See supra notes
28-30 and accompanying text.
59 While Congress perceived that the trusts of the period were raising prices, the
actual situation is much more complex. See Lande, supra note t, at 97-98.
60 As a double check, we challenge each reader of this Article to find ten intelligent friends and ask each: "Why might Congress have condemned cartels for raising
prices?" We strongly doubt that any of them-other than friends with antitrust or
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A Circumscribed and Sharply Limited Congressional Concern with
ProtectingSmall Businesses

There is nothing left of the old pre-Chicago, social/political, big
business is bad, small business is good, rationale for antitrust. 6 1 As the
previous subpart demonstrated, the overriding goal of antitrust is protecting consumers' property from being stolen by firms with market
power. But there might nevertheless be a sharply limited but distinctive way that antitrust can protect small businesses. This is because
antitrust policy should be able to take small business' welfare into
account so long as this does not cause consumers to suffer by paying
supracompetitive prices.
A purely consumer-oriented view of the antitrust laws would omit
an independent concern with the welfare of small businesses or sellers. But we would be left in a quandary over how to interpret and
effectuate fairly a number of statements in the legislative history of the
Sherman Act 6 2 that evidence a congressional desire to help protect
sellers from being forced to sell at prices below the competitive level.
For example, Senator Sherman believed that the trusts' subcompetitive pricing was as undesirable as their supracompetitive pricing:
They operate with a double-edged sword. They increase beyond
reason the cost of the necessaries of life and business, and they
decrease the cost of the raw material, the farm products of the
country. They regulate prices at their will, depress the price of what
63
they buy and increase the price of what they sell.
Congressman Allison echoed: "[T] here is a combination in the city of
Chicago which not only keeps down the price of cattle upon the hoof,

economic training-would guess that the main problem with cartels is that they cause
inefficiency. Author Lande has asked his antitrust law students these questions on
many occasions. There is no doubt that the students find both efficiency explanations
implausible. Some students often have a hard time even understanding the allocative
inefficiency explanation.
61 For a discussion of the absence of legislative history on these issues, for those
few other statements from the legislative history that did evidence a concern with
small businesses, and for an explanation why this concern was meant to be
subordinate to the Congressional concern for consumers, see Lande, supra note t,at
100-04.

62 The legislative history citations in this subpart were taken from Werden, supra
note 47. This Article's interpretation of these statements from the legislative history,
however, should not necessarily be attributed to Dr. Werden.
63 21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890) (quoting Sen. George) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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but also ... make[s] the consumers of beef pay a high price for that
article." 64 Representative Taylor asserted:
The beef trust fixes arbitrarily the daily price of cattle, from which
there is no appeal, for there is no other market. The farmers get
from one-third to half of the former value of their cattle and yet
beef is as costly as ever....
This monster robs the farmer on the one hand and the consumer
65
on the other.
Representative Bland believed: "There is no trust in this country that
to-day is robbing the farmers of the great West and Northwest of more
millions of their hard-earned money than this so-called Big Four beef
66
trust of Chicago."
We submit that, even though the overriding concern of Congress
was with protecting purchasers from paying supracompetitive prices,
antitrust policy can and should take business welfare into account in
those few situations that help businesses but do not cause consumers
to pay supracompetitive prices. We believe these desires can be
accommodated in the following manner: just as consumers should not
have to face prices that are above the competitive level, so sellers
should not have to face prices that are below the competitive level.
Read this way, the antitrust laws embody a desire for competition and
for competitive prices. These competitive prices are for everyonesellers as well as for purchasers.

64
65
66

Id. at 2470.
Id. at 4098.
Id. at 4099. Dr. Werden noted:
Falling cattle prices and the role of the beef trust in bringing them
about prompted the Senate to appoint a Select Committee on the Transportation and Sale of Meat Products to investigate whether "there exists any
combination of any kind.., by reason of which the prices of beef and beef
cattle have been so controlled or affected as to diminish the price paid to
producer without lessening the cost of meat to the consumer." After taking
extensive testimony, the Committee submitted its report on May 1, 1890.
The report reached no conclusion as to whether the companies had entered
into "a combination ... not to bid against each other in the purchase of
cattle," but had no doubt that "the principal cause of the depression in the
prices paid to the cattle raiser, and of the remarkable fact that the cost of
beef to the consumers is not decreased in proportion, comes from the artificial and abnormal centralization of markets." The report urged the passage
of the Sherman Act, which became law two months later when President
Harrison signed the bill.
Werden, supra note 47, at 715-16 (internal citations omitted).
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As a practical matter, there appear to be only two situations
where this would differ from a purely consumerist orientation of the
antitrust laws.

67

First, this would mean that buyers' cartels and other anticompetitive behavior by buyers should continue to be illegal, regardless of
whether such illegality causes higher prices for the product's ultimate
consumers. 68 If buyers' cartels were legal, sellers could be forced to
face prices that were below the competitive level. The legislative concern with competitive pricing suggests that buyers' cartels should be
illegal even in those situations where the cartel is not likely to be able
to raise prices to consumers due to, for example, a lack of downstream
market power.
For example, in Pease v. Jasper Wyman & Son,69 plaintiffs won a
$56 million verdict in a case that involved a conspiracy to suppress the
price paid to growers of wild blueberries. 70 There was no proof that
defendants had the power to force blueberry purchasers to pay
supracompetitive prices, but the jury found that the prices paid to
blueberry growers had been depressed significanly. This decision
correctly helped blueberry farmers without causing consumer prices
to rise.
The second example of a way to implement a distinct concern
with helping small businesses without causing consumers to pay
supracompetitive prices is the area of failed predation. Successful
predatory pricing should of course be condemned because it harms
67 We can also imagine a third situation in which antitrust law might want to
protect small business. Suppose a firm was in the process of becoming a monopoly by
systematically violating a non-antitrust law. For example, suppose the firm systematically used illegal child labor or paid less than the minimum wage, and these law violations gave it a significant cost advantage over its small competitors. To avoid this
unfair competition, antitrust law might want to step in and protect the small competitors. To be sure, these law violations could lead to lower prices for consumers, at least
in the short term. But consumers are entitled only to the absence of supracompetitive pricing, not to the low prices that could result from violations of the child labor
or minimum wage laws. For this reason, lower prices caused by law violations should
not count as consumer benefits under the antitrust laws.
68 See infra Part III.B. Buyers' cartels that lower prices to subcompetitive levels
also can be condemned to the extent they cause allocative inefficiency. If the buyers'
cartel can perfectly price discriminate, however, this allocative inefficiency might not
arise. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
69 845 A.2d 552 (Me. 2004).
70 Plaintiffs also won significant non-monetary relief that restructured anticompetitive pricing methods in the industry. Id. To avoid industry-wide bankruptcy, the
plaintiffs settled with the buyers' cartel for roughly $5 million. See Robert H. Lande &
Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from PrivateAntitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42
U.S.F. L. REv. 879, 890 n.41 (2008).
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consumers in the long run. 7 1 Failed predation also should be condemned even though it does not result in consumer harm 72 because it
harms innocent businesses.
Suppose, for example, that the would-be predator miscalculated
and is not able to recoup its below-cost losses due to the absence of
barriers to new entry. Or suppose that the would-be predator calculated that it would be profitable to engage in predation even if there
was only a twenty-five percent chance the predation would be successful, and this was one of the seventy-five percent of unsuccessful times.
The rival sellers should not have to face prices set artificially
below the competitive level, just as consumers should not have to face
prices set artificially above the competitive level. This conduct has no
redeeming value and should be condemned. 73 While consumers benefited in the short term from the below-cost prices, these low prices
should not count as an "antitrust benefit" because they were not the
types of low prices the antitrust laws were designed to achieve. The
main point of the antitrust laws is to prevent consumers from paying
supracompetitive prices, not to provide them with artificially low
prices.
The small business protection and consumer protection rationales for antitrust laws can be combined as follows. The antitrust laws
give consumers the right to buy at competitive prices. Prices lower
than competitive prices should not count as a consumer entitlement
or property right, and they should be condemned because they
unfairly harm innocent businesses.7 4 This view of the antitrust laws
would give a distinctive, but small and clearly limited, degree of protection to small businesses. Crucially, it would do so in a manner that
did not interfere with Congress' primary goal of protecting consumers
from paying supracompetitive prices.
71 In the long run, successful predation causes consumers to pay supracompetitive prices. Successful predation thus could be condemned under either a "stealing
from consumers" approach, or an efficiency rationale, because the long term
supracompetitive prices cause allocative inefficiency. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HER403b (3d ed. 2007); 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HER723(a) (2d ed. 2002).
72 Pricing below cost does not, of course, harm consumers. However, it does give
rise to allocative inefficiency, and thus should be condemned under an efficiency
model. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 71,
739(c).
73 In order to avoid chilling legitimate price cuts, antitrust liability for failed predation should only be imposed if the plaintiff clearly proves that prices were below
the competitive level and the defendant cannot establish any justification for its
behavior. The defendant would be excused, for example, if it could show that it was
offering a reasonable introductory discount on a new product.
74 There is no reason to presume these businesses are not equally efficient.
BERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW

BERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
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In only one of the antitrust laws has Congress elevated the protection of small business over the protection of consumers. In the Robinson-Patman Act, 75 passed during the Great Depression, Congress

strengthened the prohibition in the Clayton Act against "secondary
76
line" discrimination-discrimination that injures competing buyers.
Congress did this in order to make it more difficult for a large buyer
to gain a competitive advantage over small buyers. 77 Since such a
competitive advantage can benefit consumers-big buyers like WalMart frequently use their purchasing power to lower prices to consumers-it is clear that Congress was more concerned with protecting
small business than benefiting consumers. 78 While the Act can benefit consumers, 79 its overriding goal is not to promote consumer welfare but to shield small business from "unfair" competition.8 0 The
Robinson-Patman Act is the only area in antitrust law, therefore,
where Congress was willing to subordinate its desire to protect consumers to some other goal.
III.

THE CASE LAW

In recent years, the case law has largely adopted the view that the
ultimate goal of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers, not to
75 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (2006).
76 See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouk, 496 U.S. 543, 565-66 (1990). "Primary line" discrimination, in contrast, is discrimination that injures competing sellers. See Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993).
77 See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948) ("The legislative history of
the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be
an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer
solely because of the large buyer's quantity purchasing ability.").
78 See Terry Calvani & Gilde Breidenbach, An Introduction to the Robinson-Patman
Act and Its Enforcement by the Government, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 765, 770 (1991) ("It is quite
clear that the underlying predicate of the Robinson-Patman Act was not consumer
welfare. Rather, the Act was protectionist legislation.").
79 See John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke
Group Set the Standardsfor Buyer-Induced PriceDiscrimination and Predatory Bidding?, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 647-51 (2005) (describing five scenarios in which substantial,
persistent, and non-cost-justified discrimination induced by a powerful buyer can
harm consumers).
80 See, e.g., Coastal Fuels of P.R., Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 175 F.3d 18,
23 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[T]he Robinson-Patman Act, unlike the Sherman Act, was meant
less to protect consumer welfare than to protect small merchants ....");Rebel Oil
Co. v. Ad. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1446 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The Robinson-Patman
Act stands on entirely different footing than the Sherman Act and Clayton Act....
[T]he framers of the Sherman and Clayton Acts intended to proscribe only conduct
that threatens consumer welfare .... Fairness and protection of secondary-line purchasers are the concerns of the Robinson-Patman Act .. ").
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increase efficiency. While most decisions do not address the issue,
those that do almost always indicate that the fundamental objective of
antitrust is to improve the welfare of consumers. When courts use the
term "consumer welfare," moreover, they do not appear to be referring to economic efficiency. Judges rarely describe the goal of antitrust as enhancing efficiency and, more importantly, they never say
that conduct that harms consumers in the relevant market may be
justified if it increases the efficiency of the economy. While it is possible that courts are using "consumer welfare" as Bork did, recent opinions provide little evidence of that.8 1 In accord with the legislative
history described above, most judges seem to believe that the aim of
antitrust is to prevent behavior that deprives consumers of the benefits of competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market
power.
Today, there is only one additional objective in mainstream antitrust law.8 2 In cases involving restrictions on competition for inputs,
the courts usually aim to protect input suppliers from exploitation,
not consumers. Even in these buy-side cases, however, there are close
parallels to the consumer-oriented approach of sell-side cases. The
ultimate objective in both types of cases is to ensure that market participants-both buyers and sellers-obtain the benefits of competition. And in some of these cases, courts have refused to protect
suppliers when doing so would harm consumers.
In subpart A, we show that recent case law has generally recognized that the ultimate objective of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers, not to enhance efficiency. In subpart B, we discuss the
limited exception to that view: the courts' concern for supplier welfare in certain buy-side cases.

81 To the contrary, some decisions are quite clear. When they use the term "consumer welfare," they mean the welfare of consumers, not the welfare of society or
cartels. For most other cases, although we cannot be positive, we can still be pretty
sure they are not referring to economic efficiency. They do not mention efficiency as
an objective and they seem fixated on protecting consumers from higher prices,
regardless of cost savings.
82 The Robinson-Patman Act is outside the mainstream because, as noted above,
see supra note 80, its principal purpose is not to promote competition but to protect
small business from competition in certain circumstances. Since its protectionist features are well known, see, e.g.,
Kirkwood, supra note 79, we do not discuss the Act here.
In fact, when we refer to the antitrust laws in the remainder of this Article, we mean
the antitrust statutes other than the Robinson-Patman Act.
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The General Rule: The Overarching Objective Is to Protect Consumers,
Not Enhance Efficiency

In section 1, we provide an overview of the case law by explaining
why most courts, even when they use the ambiguous term "consumer
welfare," clearly or likely believe that in general, the preeminent
objective of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers, not enhance
efficiency. Then we examine the cases themselves. In section 2, we
focus on recent decisions that identify the ultimate purpose of the
antitrust laws or the ultimate test of whether those laws have been
violated. In section 3, we discuss two types of cases in which courts
have addressed a conflict between the welfare of consumers and economic efficiency. Finally, in section 4, we briefly describe a decision
that required consideration of social goals as well as the welfare of
consumers in an unusual context.
The Meaning of "Consumer Welfare"

1.

As noted in Part I, the term "consumer welfare" is ambiguous,
since it could refer either to the welfare of consumers in the relevant
market or to economic efficiency. This ambiguity arose because Bork
equated "consumer welfare" with the efficiency of the economy as a
whole, 83 and the Supreme Court quoted Bork when it declared that
the legislative history of the Sherman Act suggests it is a "consumer
welfare prescription. ' 84 As a result, when courts use consumer welfare
today, they could be invoking Bork's concept, not the literal meaning
of the term, and thus could be indicating that what they really care
about is total welfare, not the welfare of consumers. For four reasons,
s5
however, we doubt this is S0. 1
First, some decisions clearly take the position that the ultimate
objective of antitrust law is to benefit consumers, not to increase effiSee supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADox 66 (1978)). In Reiter, the Court did not actually endorse
Bork's definition of consumer welfare; it never addressed the issue. Moreover, it
stated that the treble-damages remedy was passed "as a means of protecting consumers from overcharges resulting from price fixing." Id. Had the Court thought that
the true goal of antitrust was to promote efficiency, not protect consumers, it would
have said that the treble-damages remedy was passed to deter firms from imposing a
deadweight loss on society. See Lande, supra note 16, at 445-47.
85 We are not alone in reaching this conclusion. See Gifford & Kudrle, supranote
30, at 432-33 ("[T]he U.S. courts do not appear to be employing [consumer welfare]
in the total-surplus sense that Bork formally attributed to it. That is, the U.S. courts
use the phrase, but they appear to be following an antitrust policy predicated on the
83
84

maximization of consumer surplus rather than total surplus.").
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ciency. In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,86 the
Supreme Court addressed a practice that could reduce allocative efficiency (failed predation) 8 7 but refused to condemn it even when it
harmed efficiency because it would lower prices to consumers. In
declaring that failed predation enhances consumer welfare, moreover, the Court measured consumer welfare not by total surplus but by
the level of prices in the market.8 8 In Brooke Group, in short, the Court
equated "consumer welfare" with the welfare of consumers, not with
total welfare, and accorded primacy to the former.8 9 In MetroNet Services Corp. v. Quest Corp.,90 the Ninth Circuit also distinguished "consumer welfare" from allocative efficiency. 9 1 And in three decisions,
the Seventh Circuit stated that the objective of the antitrust laws is to
prevent "overcharges to consumers" 92 or "transfers of wealth from
consumers to producers." 93 Because these opinions were written by
(or quoted) Judge Easterbrook, and because he understands the distinctions involved and even has declared that Congress passed the
94
antitrust laws primarily to protect consumers from wealth transfers,
86 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
87 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
88 See infra text accompanying notes 109-110.
89 See Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing,111 YALE L.J. 941, 947
n.24 (2002) (noting that the Brooke Group Court gave primacy to consumer welfare
over total welfare because the Court argued that "prices below cost are not problematic from an antitrust perspective, even though they are allocatively inefficient,
because such prices increase consumer welfare").
90 383 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2004).
91 Id. at 1136 ("Prohibiting a seller from eliminating arbitrage can diminish consumer welfare and allocative efficiency in the long run under some circumstances.");
see also infra Part III.A.3.b.
92 Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 710, 715 (7th Cir.
2006) ("'The principal purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent overcharges to consumers."' (quoting Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814
F.2d 358, 368 (7th Cir. 1987))), cert denied, 127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007).
93 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
94 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696,
1702-03 (1986). When Congress passed the Sherman Act, the "choice they saw was
between leaving consumers at the mercy of trusts and authorizing the judges to protect consumers. However you slice the legislative history, the dominant theme is the
protection of consumers from overcharges." Id. This program differs from "one
based on 'efficiency,'" though only at the margins. Id. at 1703. At other times,
though, Judge Easterbrook has equated consumer welfare with allocative efficiency.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary
Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 345, 347 ("[C]onsumers' welfare [is] a convenient shorthand for the allocative efficiency costs of monopoly."); see also L.A.P.D.,
Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook,J.) ("Antitrust law is designed to protect consumers from the higher prices-and society from
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these cases also exhibit a clear preference for the welfare of
consumers.
Second, while most opinions are less clear, they appear to support a consumer-oriented view of antitrust law because they focus on
consumer impact rather than efficiency. In assessing the conduct at
issue, they expressly examine its effect on things that matter to consumers-such as price, quality, or choice-but they never expressly
examine its effect on total welfare. They do not mention producers'
surplus; they do not compare gains in producers' surplus with reductions in consumers' surplus; and they do not ask whether increases in
productive efficiency outweigh losses in allocative efficiency. While
95
the opinions in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons HardwareLumber Co.,
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,9 6 and PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC97 are particularly striking examples, 9 8 this focus on
consumer impact is common.
Third, in recent years, very few decisions state that any aspect of
efficiency is a goal of the antitrust laws and those that do refer only to
allocative efficiency. If these courts had been following Bork, they
would have mentioned productive efficiency as well.9 9 Moreover, the
decisions that identify allocative efficiency as a goal almost always treat
the reduction in allocative efficiency-that occurs when firms with market power curtail output.").
95 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007).
96 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
97 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
98 See infra text accompanying notes 111-16 (Weyerhaeuser), text accompanying
notes 117-24 (Leegin), and text accompanying notes 129-33 (PolyGram).
99 Cf BORK, supra note 3, at 91 ("The whole task of antitrust can be summed up
as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairingproductive efficiency so
greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare." (emphasis
added)); id. ("These two types of efficiency make up the overall efficiency that determines the level of our society's wealth, or consumer welfare." (emphasis added)). It is
possible that the courts did not refer to productive efficiency because they had concluded that a case-by-case assessment of productive efficiency is unworkable, a position that both Bork and Posner have taken. See id. at 126 ("[T]he quantification of
the productive efficiency factor ... renders the problem utterly insoluble."); POSNER,
supra note 4, at 112 ("[T]he measurement of efficiency [is] an intractable subject for
litigation."); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution,Horizontal Merger and PotentialCompetition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 252, 313 (1975). Contrary to the approach of Bork and Posner, however, it is
now customary to examine the efficiency justifications for the defendant's conduct in
any rule of reason analysis under § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act and in every case
under § 7 of the Clayton Act. It seems unlikely, therefore, that productive efficiency
and overall efficiency were not identified as antitrust goals because of administrability
concerns.
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it as a correlate of consumer impact, not an independent value. 100
They do not suggest that increases in allocative efficiency may outweigh harm to consumers.
Fourth, and most important, whenever the courts have addressed
an actual or potential conflict between consumer well-being and economic efficiency, consumer interests have always prevailed. For the
last fifteen years, if not earlier, no court to our knowledge has taken
the position that an improvement in economic efficiency trumps an
adverse impact on the welfare of consumers, as we show in section
3.101

2.

Decisions Identifying the Ultimate Objective

In contrast to the assertions of Judges Bork, Ginsburg, and Posner, 10 2 antitrust decisions today rarely describe the ultimate goal of
the antitrust laws as increasing efficiency. Instead, courts in recent
years frequently state that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers or enhance consumer welfare. 10 3 That has been true
whether the decisions have emanated from the Supreme Court, the
04
appellate courts, or the district courts.'
100 See infra notes 131, 133, and accompanying text.
101 See also Edlin, supra note 89, at 948 n.25 ("Despite the wish of economists and
their fellow travelers that the goal of antitrust be to promote overall efficiency,
neither case law nor legislative history [in the U.S.] stands for the proposition that
overall economic welfare or wealth maximization trumps low prices.").
102 See supra notes 4, 7 & 8.
103 To be sure, it is even more common for courts to say that the purpose of the
antitrust laws is to promote competition or the competitive process. See Kirkwood,
supra note t, at 30-31; Werden, supra note 47, at 724-29. Since the courts almost
never define competition or the competitive process, however, these formulations do
not provide a concrete guide for determining whether or not the antitrust laws have
been violated. Suppose that a dominant firm eliminates its only rival by cutting prices
and keeping them low. Does that conduct enhance competition or reduce it? The
answer depends on the definition of competition. Without a commonly accepted definitionjudges have to resolve antitrust issues either by resort to precedent or by specifying the aims of antitrust law more concretely. In recent years, many courts have
specified the aims of antitrust more concretely by declaring that the purpose of the
antitrust laws is to protect consumers.
104 Our survey covers decisions issued in the last fifteen years as well as a few significant earlier cases. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1976)
("But all economic regulation does not necessarily suppress competition. On the
contrary, public utility regulation ... controls are necessary to protect the consumer
from exploitation."); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
489 (1968) ("The reason [that the overcharged buyer is entitled to treble damages] is
that he has paid more than he should and his property has been illegally diminished,
for had the price paid been lower his profits would have been higher.... As long as
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The Supreme. Court of the United States

Generally, Supreme Court cases resolve antitrust issues without
attempting to define what it means to promote competition under the
antitrust laws. In Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC,
Inc., 10 5 for example, the Court stated: "Interbrand competition, our
opinions affirm, is the 'primary concern of antitrust law."' 10 6 The
Court did not define interbrand competition, however, or spell out
any general test for deciding whether interbrand competition has
been enhanced or restricted. In the last fifteen years, only one
Supreme Court opinion has gone that far. In Brooke Group, the Court
identified the "traditional concern" of the antitrust laws as "consumer
welfare and price competition."1 0 7 Critically, however, the Court
equated consumer welfare not with economic efficiency but with the
benefits received by consumers in the relevant market. In analyzing
whether unsuccessful predatory pricing should be illegal, the Court
noted that below-cost pricing could sometimes cause allocative inefficiency.10 8 It declared, however, that unsuccessful predatory pricing
"produces lower aggregate prices in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced."' 0 9 In measuring consumer welfare by the level of
prices in the market rather than by allocative efficiency, the Court
signaled that the ultimate aim of antitrust law is to enhance the wellbeing of consumers in the relevant market, not maximize economic
efficiency or minimize inefficiency. Thus, the Court noted that unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to consumers. 110
In Weyerhaeuser, a more recent case challenging predatory bidding rather than predatory pricing, the Court returned to form and
did not identify the ultimate objective of the antitrust laws.111 In
deciding whether to treat predatory bidding the same as predatory
pricing, however, the Court repeatedly compared the effects of the
two practices on consumers. In total, the Weyerhaeuser opinion contains twelve references to consumer impact (for example, "consumer
the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer more than the
law allows.").
105

546 U.S. 164 (2006).

106 Id. at 180 (quoting Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19
(1977)).
107 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221
(1993).

108

Id. at 224.

109
110

Id.
Id.

111

See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069

(2007).
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welfare,"1 1 2 "lower prices to consumers,"1 1 3 "consumer harm,"''114
"effect on consumer prices""15 ). The opinion contains no references
to economic efficiency. Although the Court ultimately adopted a test
for predatory bidding that depends on the practice's effect on suppliers, not consumers, 116 that is consistent, as we explain below, with the
legislative history's concern with the transfer of wealth from innocent
parties to firms with market power. Like the Congress that passed the
Sherman Act, therefore, Weyerhaeuser focused on harm to participants
in the relevant markets, not to the efficiency of the economy.
In Leegin, the Court came closer to explicitly equating the purpose of the antitrust laws with the interests of consumers. The Court
noted, as it had in Volvo, that "the antitrust laws are designed primarily
to protect interbrand competition."1 7 It added, however, that a practice's impact on competition was directly linked to its impact on consumers. The Court stated that the rule of reason "distinguishes
between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the
consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best interest."'1 8 In articulating this one-to-one correspondence between consumer impact and competitive impact, the Court
nearly adopted a position that many lower courts have now takenthat the test of whether a practice harms competition is its impact on
consumers." 9 Moreover, the Court did not refer to economic efficiency; it said that competition is valued because it serves "the consumer" and "the consumer's best interest." Elsewhere, the Court did
state that the per se rule against resale price maintenance could cause
manufacturers to engage in "inefficient" practices, 20 and it suggested
that vertical price fixing was frequently efficient.' 21 On the whole,
however, the Court focused on the welfare of consumers. It repeatedly emphasized matters of concern to consumers such as price levels,
112 Id. at 1077 (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224).
113 Id. at 1077.
114 Id. at 1078.
115 Id.
116 See id.
117 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2007)
118 Id. at 2713.
119 See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
120 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2716.
121 Id. at 2717 ("Vertical agreements establishing minimum resale prices can have
either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circumstances
in which they are formed. And although the empirical evidence on the topic is limited, it does not suggest efficient uses of the agreements are infrequent or
hypothetical.").
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product quality, and options.1 2 2 It never mentioned "total welfare" or
"total surplus," even in explaining why inefficient vertical practices
were undesirable. On the contrary, the Court said that inefficient
practices harmed "consumer welfare" because they forced consumers
to pay higher prices.1 23 The Court declared that the per se rule
against vertical price fixing was "flawed antitrust doctrine" because it
served the "interests of lawyers .

consumers."1

24

.

. more than the interests of

b. Appellate Courts
Since the appellate courts decide many more antitrust cases than
the Supreme Court, they have referred much more often in the last
fifteen years to the ultimate purpose of the antitrust laws or to the
fundamental test for determining illegality or injury under these laws.
These references have almost always been to protecting consumers or
consumer welfare, not economic efficiency. Recently, for example,
the Seventh Circuit stated that "'The principal purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent overcharges to consumers."1 25 The Sixth Circuit quoted a trial court's statement that "'the very purpose of
antitrust law is to ensure that the benefits of competition flow to purchasers of goods affected by the violation.' "126 The Second Circuit
declared: "The antitrust laws . . .safeguard consumers by protecting

the competitive process."'127 The Ninth Circuit observed: "One of the
challenges of interpreting

. . .

the Sherman Act is ensuring that the

122 E.g., id. at 2715 ("Resale price maintenance also has the potential to give consumers more options.").

123 Id. at 2722 (noting that inefficient methods hinder consumer welfare "because
consumers are required to shoulder the increased expense of the inferior practices");
id.at 2722-23 ("The increased costs these burdensome measures generate flow to
consumers in the form of higher prices.").
124 Id. at 2723. Altogether, the Court referred to consumer interests twice as often
as it referred to efficiency. See id. (twenty-five references to "consumers," "interests of

consumers," "harmful to the consumer," and similar terms; three references to "consumer welfare"; and fourteen references to "efficiency," "inefficient," "wasteful," and
similar terms).

125 Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 710, 715 (7th Cir.
2006) (quoting Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d
358, 368 (7th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007).
126 La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 651 (E.D. Mich. 2000)). The appellate court added
that protecting consumers from higher prices "was undoubtedly a raison d'etre of the
Sherman Act when it was enacted in 1890." Id. at 910.
127 Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 489 (2d Cir.
2004).
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antitrust laws do not punish economic behavior that benefits consumers and [does not harm] the competitive process."' 28 Writing for the
D.C. Circuit, Judge Ginsburg described a practice condemned by an
antitrust court as a practice that "stands convicted in the court of consumer welfare,"'129 and his opinion suggests he meant the welfare of
consumers, not economic efficiency. When he summarized the FTC's
methodology for evaluating horizontal restraints, first announced in
In re Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry,' 30 and explained
why it was acceptable, he referred to impact on consumers eight times
but never mentioned economic efficiency.13 ' Most important, when
he described what a defendant must show under the Commission's
methodology to justify a restraint, he did not use the metric of economic efficiency. He did not say that a restraint would be justified if it
enhances productive efficiency more than it reduces allocative efficiency, or if it increases producers' surplus more than it diminishes
consumers' surplus. Instead, a defendant must show that "the
restraint in fact does not harm consumers or has 'procompetitive virtues' that outweigh its burden upon consumers."'1 32 In short, Judge
Ginsburg approved a methodology for evaluating horizontal restraints
that sought to determine a restraint's impact on consumers, not eco13 3
nomic efficiency.
128

Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 902-03 (9th Cir.

2008).
129
130

PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC,416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
110 F.T.C. 549, 602-04 (1988).

131 See PolyGram Holding, 416 F.3d at 35-37.
132 Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
133 Judge Ginsburg's opinion in PolyGram is consistent with the view he expressed
to author Lande that mergers ought to be evaluated by their impact on price, not
efficiency:
"Particularly in view of the infrequency with which efficiency showings can
convincingly be made on behalf of a proposed merger, a price-driven standard for mergers would do more to avoid lost efficiencies through overenforcement (of the Von's, Brown, or PNB sort) than could possibly be lost
by the occasional blocking of a merger that would be both price and efficiency enhancing."
Lande, supra note 16, at 460 n.118 (quoting Letter from Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg
to Robert H. Lande (Feb. 3, 1988)).
In a recent article, Judge Ginsburg wrote that the Supreme Court has endorsed
"allocative efficiency as the fundamental value underlying the antitrust laws." Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 230. The only cases he cited, however, were decided more than
twenty years ago; he did not examine the recent decisions discussed in this chapter.
Moreover, Judge Ginsburg simply showed that the older cases rejected populist goals
and proclaimed that the ultimate aim of antitrust is consumer welfare. He did not
establish that they equated consumer welfare with allocative efficiency rather than
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Many other appellate decisions have also indicated that the ultimate test of whether a practice violates the antitrust laws is its impact
on consumers. In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,' 34 the most important appellate opinion in recent years, the D.C. Circuit declared:
"[T] o be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an
'anticompetitive effect.' That is, it must harm the competitive process
and thereby harm consumers.

' 13 5

Both the Eleventh Circuit and the

Fourth Circuit have quoted this statement.1 36 The Tenth Circuit
stated: "To be judged anticompetitive, the [conduct] must actually or
potentially harm consumers."'137 In order to show antitrust injury, the
Third Circuit explained, a private plaintiff must point to an adverse
effect on consumers in the relevant market: "We must consider competition from 'the viewpoint of the consumer,' looking at 'the prices,
quantity or quality of goods or services' in the relevant geographic
market for a product to determine if there has been an injury to competition.

'1 3 8

Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook

echoed the thesis of this chapter when he declared: "Calling the selection of components for one's product a 'tie-in' does not help to
uncover practices that restrict output, drive up prices, and transfer
139
wealth from consumers to producers."
Other courts have stated that the ultimate test is whether the conduct enhances or reduces "consumer welfare." In Rebel Oil Co. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co.," 4 0 for example, the Ninth Circuit declared: "Of

course, conduct that eliminates rivals reduces competition. But
reduction of competition does not invoke the Sherman Act until it
harms consumer welfare." 14 1 According to the Second Circuit, as a
with protecting consumers in the relevant market. Although one of the older decisions cited Bork, none of them ever discussed what "consumer welfare" meant. See,
e.g., supra note 84 and accompanying text.
134 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
135 Id. at 58 (emphasis omitted).
136 See Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 376 F.3d
1065, 1071-72 (11th Cir. 2004); Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d
1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2004); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 206 (4th Cir.
2002).
137 SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994).
138 Ad. Exposition Servs. Inc. v. SMG, 262 F. App'x 449, 451 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 641 (3d Cir. 1996)), cert. denied sub
nom. Casper v. SMG, 77 U.S.L.W. 3198 (Oct. 6, 2008).
139 Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., 73 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1996).
140

51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).

141 Id. at 1433; see also Abbouds' McDonald's LLC v. McDonald's Corp., 2006-2
75,324 (9th Cir. July 7, 2006) (finding that plaintiff failed to
Trade Cas. (CCH)
"demonstrate that the defendant's alleged conduct had any effect on consumer welfare"); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com Inc., 127 F. App'x 346, 348 (9th Cir. 2005)
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rule of reason plaintiff must show that the challenged actions "'diminish overall competition, and hence consumer welfare."'

142

The First

Circuit observed that under the rule of reason, "adverse effects on
consumer welfare are an important part of the equation.

' 143

A defen-

dant's business justification, according to the Third Circuit, must
relate "'directly or indirectly to the enhancement of consumer welfare.'- 144 Apart from Rebel Oil, however, these decisions do not define
"consumer welfare," and for the reasons described in section 1, were
1 45
probably referring to the welfare of consumers, not total welfare.
c.

District Courts

Following the unmistakable trend in the higher courts, many
recent district court decisions have also recognized that the fundamental aim of the antitrust laws is to protect the welfare of consumers.1 46 The few opinions that refer to economic efficiency, moreover,
("[The challenged contract clauses] do not unreasonably restrain trade, as there is
insufficient evidence in the record that they harm consumer welfare."); MetroNet
Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Here, a false condemnation could hurt the very interest the antitrust laws seek to protect-consumer
welfare.").
142 K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir.
1995) (quoting Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1571 (11th Cir.
1983)); see also Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3d
59, 63 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he Sherman Act's essential purpose [is] safeguarding consumer welfare.").
143 Augusta News Co. v. Hudson News Co., 269 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2001).
144 LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Data
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1183 (1st Cir. 1994)).
145 Rebel Oil defines "consumer welfare" as allocative efficiency. 51 F.3d at 1444
n.15 (" [A] llocative efficiency is synonymous with consumer welfare and is the central
goal of the Sherman Act." (citation omitted)). Rebel Oil also states that "an act is
deemed anticompetitive under the Sherman Act only when it harms both allocative
efficiency and raises prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality." Id. at 1433. This comment implies that a Sherman Act plaintiff must show harm
to allocative efficiency as well as harm to consumers. It is not clear, however, that the
Ninth Circuit would preclude liability in situations in which consumers were hurt but
allocative efficiency was not. The court did not discuss instances in which the two
values conflicted and never said it would condone a practice that injured consumers
in the relevant market if the practice enhanced allocative efficiency. In the event of a
conflict, therefore, the Ninth Circuit may not actually assign preeminence to allocative efficiency. Indeed, in MetroNet, discussed below, the Ninth Circuit distinguished
consumer welfare from allocative efficiency and treated consumer welfare as the superior value. 383 F.3d at 1136.
146 See Drug Mart Pharmacy Corp. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 2d 385,
402 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("'[T] he antitrust laws are not intended to protect profit margins
but consumer welfare.'" (quoting Feldman v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 562 F. Supp.
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give equal recognition to consumer impact, suggesting thatjudges see
antitrust law as promoting both consumer well-being and economic
efficiency at the same time. 14 7 These opinions do not indicate that if
941, 950 (N.D. Ill. 1982))); Cohlmia v. Ardent Health Servs., L.L.C., 448 F. Supp. 2d
1253, 1263 (N.D. Okla. 2006) ("'[Tlhe purpose of antitrust law is the promotion of
consumer welfare."' (quoting Ginzburg v. Mem'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp.
998, 1015 (S.D. Tex. 1997))); Mumford v. GNC Franchising L.L.C., 437 F. Supp. 2d
344, 354 (W.D. Pa. 2006) ("Congress designed the Sherman Act, after all, to protect
consumer welfare by protecting competition itself, not particular competitors.");
Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 525, 529 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
("Under the rule of reason analysis a plaintiff must 'show that the defendants' actions
amounted to a conspiracy against the market-a concerted attempt to reduce output
and drive up prices or otherwise reduce consumer welfare.'" (quoting Consol. Metal
Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1988))); Davray,
Inc. v. City of Midlothian, No. Civ. A3:04-CV-0539-B, 2005 WL 1586574, at *13 (N.D.
Tex. July 6, 2005) (same); Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc. v. El Dia, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d
118, 129 (D.P.R. 2005) ("[C]onsumer welfare is the primary concern of the antitrust
laws."); Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1326 (D.
Utah 2005) ("'[W]e must bear in mind that the purpose of the antitrust laws is the
promotion of consumer welfare ....' (quoting Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Kansas, 899 F.2d 951, 960 (10th Cir. 1990))); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 686, 697 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ("'The fundamental policy underlying the law, of course, is that competition benefits consumer welfare. Here, from the
consumer perspective, the critical fact is that a generic drug reached the marketplace,
thereby enhancing consumer choice."' (quoting Eon Labs Mfg., Inc. v. Watson
Pharm., Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))); Dooley v. Crab Boat Owners
Ass'n, 2004-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,421 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2004) ("While competition among rivals does not violate the Sherman Act, a reduction of competition which
harms consumer welfare does contravene the Act."); United States v. UPM-Kymmene
Oyj, 2003-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74, 101 (N.D. I11.
July 25, 2003) ("Consumers of the
products will be damaged by paying more than they otherwise would pay [if the
merger is allowed] .... The intended purpose of federal antitrust laws is to be a
consumer welfare prescription." (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
Visa USA, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that "[s]ince defendants' exclusionary rules undeniably reduce output and harm consumer welfare," and
since defendants have not shown procompetitive justifications, the rules violate the
Sherman Act), affd, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003); In re Mercedes-Benz Antitrust Litig.,
157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 364 (D.NJ. 2001) ("Where, as here, it is alleged that consumers
paid a price higher than the price that would have been offered had the dealers been
competing, the purpose of the antitrust laws is obviously thwarted."); Danielson Food
Prods. v. Poly-Clip Sys., 120 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1143 (N.D. II1.2000) ("[T]he overarching standard, as the courts interpret it today, is whether the defendants' actions
diminish competition and injure consumer welfare."); Chase v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 49
F. Supp. 2d 553, 569 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (arguing that restraint on intrabrand competition may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act because "intrabrand competition may
provide the only significant source of consumer welfare in the relevant market").
147 See E. Portland Imaging Ctr., P.C. v. Providence Health System-Oregon, 2006-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,197 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2006) ("An act is deemed anticompetitive under the Sherman Act 'only when it harms both allocative efficiency and raises
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there were a conflict between the two goals, courts should sacrifice the
interests of consumers in the relevant market in order to improve the
efficiency of the economy. As we show in the next section, that has
also been true of courts deciding the types of cases where such a conflict might arise. For the last fifteen years, if not more, courts have
never taken the position that economic efficiency should trump consumer well-being.
3.

Conflicts Resolved in Favor of Consumers, Not Efficiency

In at least two types of cases-horizontal mergers and practices
that facilitate price discrimination-a conflict could arise between
economic efficiency and the welfare of consumers. 14 8 In merger
cases, the courts have addressed this conflict directly and ruled without exception that consumer well-being is the preeminent value. As a
result, increases in productive efficiency have mattered in merger
analysis only to the extent they were likely to be passed on to consumers in the relevant market. In the second type of case (involving practices that facilitate price discrimination), courts have not addressed
the issue directly, but statements in two decisions suggest they were
unwilling to promote economic efficiency at the expense of consumer
interests.
a.

Horizontal Mergers

A merger of competitors can increase economic efficiency even
though it reduces consumer welfare. If the merger is likely to generate both cost savings and greater market power, the increase in productive efficiency can outweigh the loss in allocative efficiency,
causing a net gain in overall efficiency, even though consumers in the
149
relevant market are hurt because they have to pay higher prices.
the prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality.'" (first
emphasis added) (quoting Rebel Oil Co., 51 F.3d at 1433)); In re NCAA 1-A Walk-on
Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2005) ("Generally, the
test for harm to competition is whether consumer welfare has been harmed such that
there has been a decrease in allocative efficiency and an increase in price.").
148 While these are not the only areas in which a conflict might arise, see Baker,
supra note 30, at 517-18, we have not found any decisions addressing the conflict in
other areas, with one exception. In Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d
922 (lst Cir. 1984), a buy-side case discussed in subpart B below, then-Judge Breyer
declared that even if the defendant's conduct reduced allocative efficiency, courts
should be reluctant to condemn it because it appeared to benefit consumers. Id. at
930-31.
149 For the classic demonstration of this proposition, see Oliver E. Williamson,
Economies As an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am. ECON. REv. 18 (1968).
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No court in the United States, however, has ever allowed a merger
that was likely to increase prices in the relevant market (or otherwise
deprive consumers of the choices a competitive market would provide) on the ground that it was likely to enhance economic efficiency.
To the contrary, the courts have uniformly insisted that merging parties cannot establish an efficiencies defense unless they show both that
the merger would generate significant cost savings and that enough of
those savings would be passed on to consumers that consumers would
benefit from (or at least not be hurt by) the merger.
Numerous decisions over the last fifteen years have adopted such
a consumer benefit standard. In FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 150 the D.C.
Circuit stated that a "'defendant who seeks to overcome a presumption that a proposed acquisition would substantially lessen competition must demonstrate that the intended acquisition would result in
significant economies and that these economies ultimately would benefit competition and, hence, consumers."' 15 1 In FTC v. Swedish
Match, 152 Judge Hogan held that the defendants' efficiency evidence
was insufficient to overcome the presumption of illegality because the
defendants had not shown what proportion of their cost savings they
would pass on and "how that will defeat the likely price increases in
this market."' 15 " Likewise, in FTC v. Libbey, Inc.,154 the district court
ruled that although the defendants' efficiencies evidence "demonstrates that there could potentially be some positive results of the
acquisition," it did not "outweigh the potential harm to the market"
from higher prices.1 55 In particular, the defendants had not shown
"why Libbey will not use this opportunity to raise its own prices." 156 In
United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center,157 the court stated:
Williamson also shows that in many circumstances, economic efficiency would
increase even though the merger would impose a relatively large price increase and
produce relatively small cost savings. This occurs because what counts in efficiency
analysis is the deadweight loss, not the transfer of wealth from consumers to the
merged firm. For analyses of this tradeoff that determine how large efficiencies must
be to prevent prices from rising to consumers, see Fisher et al., Afterword, supra note
58, at 1702-06; Fisher & Lande, supra note 58, at 1670-77; Fisher et al., Horizontal
Mergers, supra note 58, at 797-810.
150 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
151 Id. at 720 (quoting FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir.

1991)).
152 131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000).
153 Id. at 172.
154 211 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002).
155 Id. at 53.
156 Id.
157 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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"[W]ith regard to the so-called 'efficiencies defense,' the defendants
must clearly demonstrate that the proposed merger itself will, in fact,
58
create a net economic benefit for the health care consumer."'
All these decisions stand for the proposition that "an acquisition
that lowers costs may still be unlawful 'if it results in an increased likelihood of higher prices."' 1

59

Other cases concur, 160 and there is no

decision to the contrary. The merger cases to date, therefore, have
uniformly applied a consumer impact standard, rather than a total
16 1
welfare standard, to the evaluation of claimed efficiencies.
In some of these cases, moreover, this position was not simply
dictum. The court found actual or potential merger-specific efficiencies but disregarded some or all of those cost savings because they
16 2
were unlikely to be passed on to consumers. In FTC v. Staples, Inc.,
the defendants asserted that the challenged transaction would produce a variety of efficiencies, including better prices fromvendors and
reduced distribution costs.

163

Although Judge Hogan identified

numerous flaws in this defense, he did not conclude that the merger
would generate no significant efficiencies. To the contrary, he stated
that "the Court believes that there would be some efficiencies realized
158 Id. at 147.
159 Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 798 F. Supp. 762, 777 (D.D.C. 1992) (quoting Administrative Record at 233, Dr. Pepper, 798 F. Supp. 762 (No. 1:91cv02712)),
rev'd on other grounds, 991 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
160 See, e.g., FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 153 (D.D.C. 2004) ("The
existence

of such

efficiencies

. .

.

remains

relevant

to

an

assessment

of

the ... potential benefits to consumers from cost reductions and increased competition."); United States v. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (W.D. Wis.
2000) ("Defendants have not made the necessary showing that efficiencies would
result and that they would lead to benefits for consumers in the relevant market.");
FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937, 948 (E.D. Mo. 1998) ("[M]any of
the projected efficiencies would not benefit Poplar Bluff consumers."), rev'd, 186 F.3d
1045 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1090 (D.D.C. 1997)
("[D]efendants' projected pass through rate-the amount of the projected savings
that the combined company expects to pass on to customers in the form of lower
prices-is unrealistic."); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1301
(W.D. Mich. 1996) (positing that acquisition would yield substantial cost savings "that
would, in view of defendants' nonprofit status and the Community Commitment,
invariably be passed on to consumers"), affd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997).
161 Professors Gifford and Kudrle observe that "[m]any courts have indicated that
some of the merger-generated cost savings must be passed on to consumers, thus
suggesting a consumer-surplus approach to the evaluation of efficiency." Gifford &
Kudrle, supra note 30, at 447 n.83. They conclude that American merger case law
.appears to equate the 'consumer welfare' goal of antitrust law with the use of a consumer surplus standard," not a total surplus standard. Id. at 446.
162 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
163 See id. at 1089-90.
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by the merger."' 64 He ruled that these savings did not excuse the
transaction, however, because most of them would not be passed
on, 165 and thus consumers in the relevant markets would likely pay
higher rather than lower prices after the merger. 166 Likewise, in Dr.
Pepper/Seven-Up the district court found that the acquisition was likely
to yield significant efficiencies. 6 7 These cost reductions did not save
the acquisition, though, because there was considerable evidence that
the acquisition would increase prices in the relevant market. 68 In
Libbey, the court was also unwilling to conclude that the merger would
generate no efficiencies.' 69 It disregarded the potential for cost savings, however, because the defendants had failed to explain why the
170
merger would not lead to higher prices.
The approach in these cases is inconsistent with a total welfare
standard. Instead of calculating the impact of the transaction on producers' surplus and consumers' surplus and comparing the two magnitudes, the courts simply asked whether the transaction would
benefit consumers in the relevant market. While this means that no
case actually found that a merger would increase economic efficiency,
there is no evidence that these judges would have elevated total welfare over the welfare of consumers had they found an increase in total
welfare.'71
164 Id. at 1092.
165 Id. at 1090 ("[T]he Court also finds that the defendants' projected pass
through rate .. .is unrealistic.... [T]he defendants have projected a pass through
rate of two-thirds of the savings while the evidence shows that, historically, Staples has
passed through only 15-17%.").
166 Id. at 1091 ("Without an injunction, consumers in the 42 geographic markets
where superstore competition would be eliminated or significantly reduced face the
prospect of higher prices than they would have absent the merger.").
167 Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 798 F. Supp. 762, 777 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding "merit in plaintiffs' argument" that the acquisition "would create cost efficiencies
in the distribution and marketing of Seven-Up products in the New York metropolitan market").
168 Id. (finding that an acquisition is unlawful, despite its cost savings, if it would
result in higher prices and that there was "ample evidence in the record from which
the Commission could rationally conclude that such an outcome was likely").
169 FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 2002).
170 Id. ("Although the evidence presented by the defendants demonstrates that
there could potentially be some positive results of the acquisition, the Court does not
believe that these results outweigh the potential harm to the market that could result
given the fact that there has not been sufficient evidence to establish ... why Libbey
will not use this opportunity to raise its own prices.").
171 None of these decisions considered Professor Baker's limited exception to a
consumer impact standard. See Baker, supra note 30, at 520 n.137 ("[A]ntitrust
should seek to protect consumers except when the aggregate efficiency costs of doing
so would be large."). In contrast, Canada allowed the merger of Superior Propane
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Practices That Facilitate Price Discrimination

A conflict between economic efficiency and consumer well-being
may also arise when the challenged practice facilitates price discrimination. The conflict arises because a monopolist that initially charges
a single monopoly price may be able to increase both its profits and
economic efficiency by engaging in price discrimination. Indeed, if
the monopolist could practice perfect (or first-degree) price discrimination, it would maximize allocative efficiency, since by charging each
one of its customers its reservation price, the monopolist would
increase its sales from the monopoly level to the perfectly competitive
level. Such a move would reduce the welfare of consumers, however,
because it would completely eliminate consumers' surplus and magnify the transfer of wealth from consumers to the monopolist. Thus, if
a firm with monopoly power uses a tying arrangement to achieve firstdegree price discrimination, the tie would be desirable on efficiency
1 72
grounds but harmful to consumers.
and ICG Propane, even though it would harm consumers, because it would produce a
substantial increase in total welfare. Specifically, the Canadian Competition Tribunal
found that the transaction would result in a significant price increase and a wealth
transfer of approximately $40.5 million a year. See Comm'r of Competition v. Superior Propane, Inc., [2003] 3 F.C. 529,
22 (Can.). The Tribunal also concluded,
however, that it would pass a total surplus test, even if the surplus were reduced to
reflect the merger's adverse effects on low income consumers. The Federal Court of
Appeal sustained this conclusion, upholding the following findings of the Tribunal:
(a) the merger would generate efficiency gains of $29.2 million a year, id. 15; (b)
the deadweight loss from the price increase and an expected reduction in services
offered would not exceed $6 million a year, id.; (c) the only portion of the wealth
transfer that should be included was the transfer from "low income households that
used propane for essential purposes and had no good alternatives," a transfer of just
$2.6 million a year, id. 24; and (d) even if this transfer was doubled-the highest
reasonable weight that could be assigned-the total anticompetitive effects of the
merger would not exceed $11.2 million ($6 million in deadweight loss plus $5.2 million in weighted wealth transfer), an amount that was less then the merger's efficiency
gains. Id. 25. For a more in depth analysis of this case, see Fisher et al., supra note
31.
172 See, e.g., Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 30, at 432 n.32 ("The use of tying
arrangements ... to effect first-degree price discrimination would be treated as lawful
under a total surplus standard but as unlawful under a consumer surplus standard.");
accord Baker, supra note 30, at 518 n.128; Warren S. Grimes & Lawrence A. Sullivan,
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v.Independent Ink, Inc.: Requirements Tie-Ins and Intellectual

Property, 13 Sw. J.L. & TRADE Am. 335, 347-49 (2007). Professor Areeda addressed a
similar situation-a perfectly discriminating cartel-and recognized that it maximized efficiency, but he had no doubt that it reduced consumer welfare:
The perfectly discriminating cartel is taking from some people and giving to
other people more than competition would. I regard this as an anticompetitive distortion. "Consumer welfare" embraces what individual consumers are
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Even if a tying arrangement does not achieve first-degree price
discrimination, it may present a tradeoff between the welfare of consumers and economic efficiency, since it may increase total surplus
but reduce consumers' surplus. 173 The only relatively recent case that
touches on this conflict is Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde. 174 In that case, after noting that a tying arrangement can facili-

tate price discrimination, 75 the Supreme Court stated that such discrimination "can increase the social costs of market power
by... increasing monopoly profits over what they would be absent the
tie."' 176 By characterizing an increase in monopoly profits as a "social

cost," the Court was endorsing a consumer-oriented view of antitrust
law, since an increase in monopoly profits represents a cost to consumers but may not represent a loss in economic efficiency. To the
contrary, the discrimination may enhance efficiency. The Court did
not note this possibility, however, or even mention economic efficiency. Instead, the Court referred to "the consumer-whose interests the statute was especially intended to serve."' 177 Jefferson Parish
suggests, therefore, that if a tying arrangement facilitates price discrimination, it would be undesirable if it harms consumers in the rele78
vant market, even if it increases efficiency.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit considered another practice that
facilitated price discrimination and evaluated it primarily, if not excluentitled to expect from a competitive economy. If the efficiency extremists
insist that only their definition of consumer welfare is recognized by economists, we would answer that ours is clearly recognized by the statutes. The
legislative history of the Sherman Act is not clear on much, but it is clear on
this.
Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 536 (1983).
173 William F. Baxter & Daniel P. Kessler, Toward a Consistent Theory of the Welfare
Analysis of Agreements, 47 STAN-. L. REv. 615, 623-24 (1995).

174 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
175 Id. at 15 n.23 (explaining that "[s]ales of the tied item can be used to measure
demand for the tying item," forcing "purchasers with greater needs for the tied item"
to "in effect ... pay a higher price to obtain the tying item," while purchasers with
lesser needs for the tied item in effect pay a lower price for the tying item).
176 Id. at 14-15.
177 Id. at 15. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion also used language that
evokes a consumer protection approach to antitrust. She noted that market power in
the tying product may result in "exploitation of consumers." Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
178 See id. at 12-16 (majority opinion); see also Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 30, at
432 n.32 ("An old Supreme Court decision that dealt with [the price discrimination]
issue took the route indicated by the consumer surplus standard." (citing IBM Corp.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936))).
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sively, in terms of consumer impact. 179 In MetroNet, the challenged
practice facilitated price discrimination because it prevented the
plaintiff, a reseller of the defendant's services, from engaging in arbitrage and undermining the defendant's discriminatory pricing structure. 180 In upholding the practice, the court noted: "Prohibiting a
seller from eliminating arbitrage can diminish consumer welfare and
allocative efficiency in the long run under some circumstances.' 18 1
Although the court referred to both allocative efficiency and consumer welfare, it never considered instances in which the elimination
of arbitrage would harm consumers but increase efficiency. Rather, in
every example the court considered, the elimination of arbitrage
would have the same impact on both the welfare of consumers and
allocative efficiency. Nothing in the Ninth Circuit's opinion suggests,
therefore, that a positive impact on efficiency would outweigh a negative impact on consumer well-being. In addition, the court sometimes
evaluated the desirability of preventing arbitrage by examining consumer welfare alone. The court stated, for example, that if a seller
could not prevent arbitrage:
[T] he seller might choose not to offer a discounted price in the first
place and instead charge a uniform price to all consumers. If the
uniform price it would set is as high as the price the seller would
have charged the disfavored consumers if price discrimination
18 2
could be maintained, consumer welfare would diminish.
Moreover, the court summed up its analysis by stating: "Here, a
false condemnation could hurt the very interest the antitrust laws seek
to protect-consumer welfare."'1 83 Like Jefferson Parish, therefore,
MetroNet suggests that the desirability of price discrimination depends
on its impact on consumers, not efficiency.

179 See MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2004).
180 Id.
181 Id.at 1136.
182 Id. In this example, the court concluded that consumer welfare would be
diminished because the favored customers would no longer have the opportunity to
purchase at a discounted price, while the disfavored customers would continue to
purchase at a high price. The court measured consumer welfare, therefore, by price
levels in the market, not by output, deadweight loss, or other components of allocative efficiency. When the court referred to the impact of arbitrage on both "consumer welfare and allocative efficiency," it also distinguished consumer welfare from
allocative efficiency. Id.
183 Id.
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Social Goals As Well As Consumer Welfare?

On one occasion, in United States v. Brown University,184 the Third
Circuit indicated that an allegedly anticompetitive agreement could
not be fully evaluated without considering both its impact on consumers and its asserted "noneconomic justifications."1 85 This unusual
decision-the only one of its kind we found-arose because the Ivy
League schools and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (the Ivy
Overlap Group) agreed that they would not compete for desirable students by offering them better financial aid packages. Instead, the colleges pledged they would only offer financial aid on the basis of need
and would assess the need of each prospective student in the same
way. 186 By eliminating merit aid at the Overlap schools, the agreement raised the cost of attending those schools for students who
would otherwise have received a merit scholarship. At the same time,
the agreement lowered the cost of attendance for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, since the schools plowed much, if not all, of
the money they saved from not giving merit aid into larger scholarships for needy students.1 87 Because the agreement eliminated price
competition among the Overlap schools-a scholarship is in effect a
reduction in tuition price-the district court concluded that only a
"quick look" was necessary to condemn it.1 88 The Third Circuit
decided, however, that a more extensive analysis was required. 189
In describing the scope of this analysis, the court never indicated
that its ultimate aim was to determine whether the Overlap agreement
enhanced economic efficiency. To the contrary, as the court noted
more than once, the primary purpose of the Sherman Act is to benefit
consumers.' 90 On remand, therefore, the Third Circuit instructed the
district court that it had to consider more fully two of the "pro-con184
185
186
187

5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 678.
Id. at 662-63.
MIT asserted that it did not make any money from the agreement. See id. at

664. The case focuses on MIT because all the other members of the Overlap Group
signed consents immediately after the complaint was filed. Only MIT chose to litigate. Id. at 662 n.1.
188 See id. at 664-65.
189 See id. at 678.
190 The court first made this point in the course of rejecting the colleges' argument that they were exempt from the Sherman Act because they were nonprofit organizations. The court stated: "Nonprofit organizations are not beyond the purview of
the Sherman Act, because the absence of profit is no guarantee that an entity will act
in the best interest of consumers." Id. at 665. The court later added: "Enhancement
of consumer choice is a traditional objective of the antitrust laws . . . ." Id. at 675.
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sumer" ' justifications MIT asserted: (1) by increasing socio-economic diversity at each school, the agreement improved the quality of
the school's education, enhancing its "consumer appeal;"19 2 and (2)
by increasing the amount of financial aid extended to needy students,
the agreement enabled some students to attend Overlap schools who
19 3
could not otherwise have enrolled, "widening consumer choice."'
Evaluating these claimed consumer benefits, however, would not
be enough to determine whether the agreement was permissible.
According to the Third Circuit, the district court also had to consider
the "noneconomic justifications proffered by MIT,"' 19 4 in particular, its
claim that the agreement increased "educational access and opportunity" 19 5 for poor and minority students. The Third Circuit ruled that
access and opportunity were elements of "social welfare"19 6 because
Congress had, for more than twenty-five years, created and funded
"programs that distribute financial aid exclusively on the basis of
need."'19 7 The court never explained, though, why Congress wanted
these important social goals to play a role in Sherman Act analysis
beyond the role already played by consumer welfare. If the Overlap
agreement benefited consumers because it raised product quality and
expanded consumer choice, there was no need to consider its
noneconomic justifications. If, however, the agreement made consumers as a whole worse off, what aspect of the language or legislative
history of the Sherman Act would authorize the court to uphold it?
The court cited none.
The issue was critical because the elite schools had decided to
promote access and opportunity by transferring wealth from some
consumers to others: the agreement took money from very talented
students who would otherwise have received merit aid and gave it to
needy students who could not otherwise have afforded an Overlap
education. While the agreement expanded the choices of poor and
minority

students,

it restricted

the choices

of other

students.

Although such a forced transfer of wealth might be desirable social
policy, Congress could have achieved it by altering the tax code.
Here, however, a group of elite colleges reduced competition among
themselves in order to impose the transfer on consumers. The court
191

Id. at 678.

192
193
194
195
196
197

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.

674.
675.
678.
675.
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did not explain why Congress intended to exempt such a private
restraint from the Sherman Act.
Brown appears, then, to have departed from the central mission
of antitrust: it relied on social goals rather than consumer protection
and it allowed competition to be suppressed in order to benefit some
consumers over others. Despite these flaws, the implications of the
decision are narrow. First, the social values the court considered are
closely linked to consumer protection. The court wanted to promote
educational access and opportunity in order to advance the well-being
of certain consumers-poor and minority students who would not
otherwise be able to obtain an Overlap education. 198 While the court
was less concerned about the welfare of other consumers, the court's
interest in helping disadvantaged consumers was plain. Second, in
order to justify its use of social goals, the court invoked the federal
need-based financial aid statutes. 19 9 These laws have no relevance to
most Sherman Act decisions.
B.

The Sharply Limited Concern for Small Business: ProtectingInput
Suppliers from Exploitation2° °

When a case involves restrictions on competition for inputs-and
no danger to downstream consumers-courts focus on protecting
input suppliers from exploitation, not consumers. This focus is
entirely understandable. Suppose the only two pipelines serving a natural gas field merge and then lower the prices they offer gas suppliers
with wells in this field. As indicated in Part II, this merger should be
20 1
illegal even if it had no discernible adverse effect on gas consumers.
198
199

Id. at 678.
Id. at 675.

200 As we explained above, supra note 82, we do not discuss case law under the
Robinson-Patman Act. This subpart addresses cases under the other antitrust laws in
which the challenged conduct may harm input suppliers, who are often small
businesses.
201 This example is derived from Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1307-08 (5th Cir. 1971). The merger might have no
measurable effect on downstream consumers if the pipelines deliver their gas to a
distribution point that is served by other pipelines. If the merged pipelines had a
trivial share in this downstream market, their output decisions would not have a material impact on the market price.
If there is perfect price discrimination by the merged firm, output will not fall
and no allocative inefficiency will be created. In this case the price discrimination
could be condemned under a wealth transfer approach, but not on efficiency
grounds. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV.
548, 550-52 & 552 n.6 (1969). However, if the merged firm does not engage in perfect price discrimination, the lower amount of natural gas produced in this field will
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It would create market power on the buying side (monopsony power);
it would deny the gas suppliers the benefits of a competitive market;
and it would transfer wealth from the suppliers to the pipelines. As a
result, most courts would condemn the merger-and the resulting
exploitation of gas suppliers-even if gas consumers were not hurt. In
Telecor Communications, Inc.,20 2 for example, the Tenth Circuit stated:
"The Supreme Court's treatment of monopsony cases strongly suggests that suppliers ... are protected by antitrust laws even when the
anti-competitive activity does not harm end-users." 20 3 Likewise, in
Weyerhaeuser the Court required predatory bidding plaintiffs to show
20 4
an adverse impact on suppliers, not consumers.
This concern with the welfare of suppliers in buy-side cases is not,
however, a significant departure from the concern with the welfare of
consumers in the rest of antitrust law. First, buy-side cases are relatively rare in antitrust. 20 5 Historically, most antitrust enforcement has
20 6
been directed at anticompetitive behavior by sellers, not buyers.
Second, the courts' focus on supplier interests in buy-side cases is simply the mirror image of their focus on consumer interests in sell-side
cases. Just as Congress wanted to prevent sellers from using unfair
means to acquire monopoly power (because they could then raise output prices and transfer wealth from consumers to themselves), Congress wanted to prevent buyers from using unfair means to acquire
monopsony power (because they could then lower input prices and
transfer wealth from suppliers to themselves).207 The desire to stop
the transfer of wealth by firms who had unfairly gained power is the
instead be produced somewhere else, where its production will be relatively less efficient. Thus, imperfect price discrimination by a buyer sometimes can be condemned
on efficiency grounds. See Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Cooperative Research and
Development, 4 RANDJ. ECON. 527, 527 (1986).
202 Telecor Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2002).
203 Id. at 1133-34; accord White Mule Co. v. ATC Leasing Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 869,
888 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (rejecting argument that suppliers are not protected by antitrust laws); see also Pease v. Jasper Wyman & Son, 845 A.2d 552, 555 (Me. 2004)
(upholding antitrust damages awarded to blueberry growers); infra note 213 (citing
additional cases).
204 In order to satisfy the second prong of the Court's test, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct created a dangerous probability of monopsony power,
not monopoly power. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,
127 S.Ct. 1069, 1078 (2007).

205

See ROGER D. BLAIR

&JEFFREY

L.

HARRISON, MONOPSONY

(1993) (collecting and

analyzing the relatively small number of cases against buyers).
206 See id. at 1, 18-19; Albert A. Foer, Introduction to Symposium on Buyer Power and
Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 505, 505 (2005).
207 See Weyerhaeuser, 127 S.Ct. at 1075-78 (observing the similarity between buyside and sell-side cases).
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same in both instances. So is the desire to preserve the benefits of
competition for the other side of the market. The concern with supplier welfare in buy-side cases, in short, flows from the same legislative
and normative roots as the concern with consumer welfare in sell-side
cases.
Finally, in some buy-side cases courts have ruled that where powerful buyers extract concessions from suppliers and pass them on to
consumers, the interests of consumers should prevail over the welfare
20 8
of suppliers. In Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artist Pictures Corp.,
for example, the Sixth Circuit examined an agreement between competing distributors to refrain from bidding against each other for
films. Although the agreement would likely harm film suppliers, the
court refused to hold it per se illegal because it "may lower prices to
moviegoers at the box office and may serve rather than undermine
consumer welfare." 20 9 Likewise, in Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc.,2 10 the First Circuit rejected an attack on Blue Shield's practice of capping the amounts that participating doctors could charge
Blue Shield subscribers. While this practice may have resulted in payments to doctors that were below the competitive level, 21' the court was
unwilling to condemn it. In explaining why, then-Judge Breyer
emphasized that the practice seemed to benefit consumers:
[T] he prices at issue here are low prices, not high prices.... [T] he
Congress that enacted the Sherman Act saw it as a way of protecting
These
consumers against prices that were too high, not too low ....
facts suggest that courts at least should be cautious-reluctant to
condemn too speedily-an arrangement that, on its face, appears to
2 12
bring low price benefits to the consumer.
To be sure, more recent decisions have disagreed, holding that
anticompetitive practices by buyers cannot be justified by showing that
the buyers passed on some of their gains to consumers. 21 3 If such
208 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989).
209 Id. at 317.
210 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984).
211 The court assumed, for the purpose of evaluating plaintiffs' case, that "Blue
Shield possesses significant market power" and that "Blue Shield uses that power to
obtain 'lower than competitive prices.'" Id. at 927.
212 Id. at 930-31. In Kartell, therefore, Judge Breyer indicated that a conflict
between allocative efficiency and the welfare of consumers should be resolved in favor
of consumers. If Blue Shield had paid physicians less than the competitive rate, as
Judge Breyer was willing to assume, then Blue Shield's behavior reduced allocative
efficiency. YetJudge Breyer would not hold it illegal, in part because it brought "low
price benefits to the consumer." Id. at 931.
213 In Knevelbaard Dairiesv. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2000), the court
rejected the defendants' attempt to justify an alleged buying cartel by claiming it
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decisions are followed, the welfare of suppliers might in some cases
take precedence over the welfare of consumers. Even then, however,
the small business goal in antitrust law would be quite limited: it
would apply only where suppliers have been exploited by the anticompetitive behavior of buyers, and only where consumers would not be
forced to pay supracompetitive prices. Moreover, the focus of antitrust law would remain on protecting traders from exploitation,
whether consumers or suppliers, not on increasing efficiency. 214
None of the buy-side decisions discussed in this section indicate that
2 15
the overarching goal of antitrust law is economic efficiency.
would result in lower prices to consumers. The court stated that the public interest
would be furthered by "free competition" among buyers. Id. at 988 (quoting Speegle
v. Bd. of Fire Underwriters, 172 P.2d 867, 873 (Cal. 1946)). In Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998), the Tenth Circuit rebuffed the
defendant's argument that its ceiling on the salaries Division I colleges could pay
entry-level basketball coaches was a reasonable restraint because it lowered the costs
of college basketball. The court declared that "cost-cutting by itself is not a valid
procompetitive justification. If it were, any group of competing buyers could agree
on maximum prices. Lower prices cannot justify a cartel's control of prices charged
by suppliers, because the cartel ultimately robs the suppliers of the normal fruits of
their enterprises." Id. at 1022. While the court stated that cost-cutting "by itself' is
not valid defense, the court later asserted that lowering costs "arguably is beneficial to
the members of the industry and ultimately their consumers." Id. at 1023 (quoting
Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2643
(1996)). Like Knevelbaard Dairies, therefore, Law appears to have rejected a pass-on
defense to buyer price fixing.
214 For a discussion of the importance of protecting small suppliers from exploitation, see Warren S. Grimes, Buyer Power and Retail Gatekeeper Power: Protecting Competition and the Atomistic Seller, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 563 (2005).
215 In his recent analysis of buy-side and other cases, supra note 47, Gregory Werden gets many things right. He correctly notes that "Congress intended to protect
sellers victimized by trusts and other conduct within the scope of the Sherman Act's
prohibitions." Id. at 714. He also recognizes that sellers should be protected from
anticompetitive conduct by buyers whether or not the conduct "threatens the welfare
of [the buyers'] customers or the welfare of end users." Id. at 735. Moreover, he
concludes that "consumer welfare is the principal goal of the Sherman Act," id., and
that "the Sherman Act protects the competitive process in the expectation that doing
so best protects consumer welfare over the long term," id. at 729. He is incorrect,
however, when he says, "to the extent that the Court has taken seriously the proposition that the Sherman Act is a 'consumer welfare prescription,' it must have meant a
broad welfare concept, such as aggregate welfare." Id. at 723. In recent years, as we
have shown, both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have largely adopted the
proposition that the ultimate objective of the antitrust laws in sell-side cases is to protect consumers in the relevant market, not to enhance aggregate welfare.
Werden's contrary conclusion rests on an incomplete analysis of recent case law.
He does not mention the Court's willingness in Brooke Group to sacrifice allocative
efficiency in order to achieve lower prices for consumers; the Court's articulation in
Leegin of a one-to-one correspondence between effects on consumers and effects on
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THE DESIRABILITY OF ANTITRUST'S CONSUMER
PROTECTION MISSION

Not only is the wealth transfer approach the best explanation for
both the antitrust laws' legislative histories and the case law, we believe
it is also more desirable than the efficiency standard. The issue of
which approach is most desirable is, of course, subjective. It is, moreover, irrelevant: what counts is congressional intent. Nevertheless,
there certainly are reasons why antitrust is and should be concerned
with protecting consumers from paying more because of illegally
acquired market power.
First, it should not be surprising that voters in a democracy prefer
an antitrust system that helps far more people than it hurts. 2 16 This is
likely to be true even if there might be an efficiency-based system that
would help a small group of people (owners of monopolies and cartels) in the aggregate more than the vast bulk of people were
2 17
harmed.
competition; or the Court's distinct focus in both Leegin and Weyerhaeuser on consumer impact rather than efficiency. He also misses lower court statements that conduct cannot reduce competition or cause antitrust injury unless it threatens to harm
consumers in the relevant market; the lower courts' failure to characterize productive
efficiency as a goal of the antitrust laws, even though it is an essential component of
aggregate welfare; the courts' unwillingness to say that either productive efficiency or
allocative efficiency trumps consumer impact; and, most important, the courts' uniform refusal to consider the productive efficiencies of a merger unless they are likely
to be passed on to consumers in the relevant market. Werden is correct that "[a]ctual
adverse effects on consumer welfare never have to be proved; rather, it is sufficient
that a restraint impairs the competitive process in a manner that makes harm to consumer welfare predictable." Id. at 736. But the "harm to consumer welfare" that must
be predictable is harm to consumers in the relevant market, not harm to economic
efficiency.
216 For an example of such a system, see Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the
Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare
Standard 1 (Nov. 4, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://govinfo.
library.unt.edu/amc/publicstudies_fr28902/exclus-conduct-pdf/051104_Salopmergers.pdf.
217 See id. at 1-2. For a thorough analysis of these and related issues that comes to
a somewhat different position, see Baker, supra note 30. Professor Baker believes:
The interpretation of antitrust law as a [political] bargain between consumer and producer interests .... [suggests that] antitrust enforcers and

courts should seek to maximize aggregate surplus, subject to the constraint
that consumers and producers sufficiently share the efficiency gains, at least
on average . . . . [T]his perspective implies that antitrust law should be
enforced today with a qualified emphasis on consumers: protecting consumers without regard to aggregate surplus unless the aggregate efficiency costs
of doing so would be large.
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Suppose two companies wanted to merge to a monopoly and this
would cause prices to rise so that 10,000,000 consumers would each
pay an additional $100, or $1 billion in total. Also suppose this
merger would benefit the firms by $1.1 billion. Suppose that the $1.1
billion would go to the firm's stockholders, and that only a small
minority of the supracompetitively priced product's consumers also
held stock in either company.
Would this arrangement be efficient? Yes, by $100 million. Is the
arrangement "fair" to the vast majority of the consumers who are not
stockholders? The answer to this question depends upon who defines
"fair," but suppose we put this issue to a vote? Wouldn't almost everyone vote, "Don't take my money just because taking $100 from me will
gain the monopoly $110"?
Suppose the firms went to the consumers and said, "This merger
will help us more than it will hurt you, so please allow us do it." The
consumers, being good Coasians, 218 should respond: "So long as you
give us back slightly more than we would lose, you can do it. We are
willing to split the gain with you. If you pay us $105 we all will be
happy and the most efficient allocation of resources will arise."
2 19
Wouldn't most people think that the $105 payment would be "fair"?
How likely is it that consumers instead voluntarily would say, "I would
lose $100 but you would gain $110, so go ahead and take my property
without paying me anything at all"?
Each reader can judge for his or herself whether they would
agree to this. Regardless, isn't it reasonable to suppose that the majority of people would prefer to keep their $100? For this reason the
Id. at 484-85. Many of the ideas in this argument were suggested to author Lande by
Professor Stephen Ross.
Prof. Baker does not, however, discuss whether such a rule follows from the antitrust laws' legislative histories or would be administrable. Would it be as easy to predict, understand, or administer a rule that mergers should not be allowed to lead to
higher consumer prices unless the resulting efficiency savings were "large," as it would
be to predict, understand, or administer a rule that no merger should be allowed to
lead to higher consumer prices?
218 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The
Coase Theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs, the efficient allocation
of property rights will result regardless who initially owns the right. If transaction
costs are negligible, the parties can and will bargain over this right. As a result of this
bargaining, the person willing to pay the most for the right will end up with it, and
this will result in the most efficient allocation of resources. See Steven C. Salop, Note
on the Coase Theorem 1 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
219 It also would be consistent with the Coase Theorem. See Salop, supra note 218,
at 1.
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passage of consumer-oriented antitrust laws seems quite logical for a
democracy to do.
Second, isn't the efficiency view of antitrust another form qf
"trickle down economics"?

220

Doesn't the efficiency view embody the

hope that if we allow businesses to take from consumers in the short
run, then eventually, somehow, in some indirect, uncertain and difficult to explain long-run manner, the money will find its way back to
society as a whole, including consumers, perhaps along with interest
so that all told we will be better off overall?
Under this perspective the antitrust laws have a focus on the definite, the more observable and explainable, and often this means the
short run. Perhaps in the short term we know that cartels and monopolies are "stealing" from consumers, but that maybe the resources
really could be used better elsewhere in the economy in the long run.
But no one knows what will actually happen in the long run, such as
whether the public at large eventually will benefit, because the long
run is much more uncertain. Can we be forgiven for being skeptical
of the pleas of monopolies and cartels that being good to them in the
short run will be desirable for society in the long run? Are we so certain of this that we should even let them "steal" from us in the short
run?
In the long run economists remind us that we are all dead, 22 1 so
can the citizens of a democracy be forgiven for asking them to skip the
complicated arguments about long run resource allocation that might
or might not prove to be true? This reason for enacting the antitrust
laws is reminiscent of famous lines from the Rubdiydt of Omar
Khayydm:

220 "Trickle down economics" advocates assisting businesses and the well-to-do in
the short run in order to benefit all members of society in the long run. See William
B. Barker, The Three Faces of Equality: ConstitutionalRequirements in Taxation, 57 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 1, 50 (2006); see also Daniel Seligman, Tricklism, FORTUNE, Nov. 16, 1992,
at 199, 199 ("TDE [trickle down economics] has a long history. The MBA's Dictionary tells us the phrase was coined by Will Rogers, and Safire's Political Dictionary,
produced by the eminent New York Times pundit, notes that it gained fame in the
1932 election, when Herbert Hoover was accused of believing in tricklism-'feeding
the sparrows by feeding the horses.' A half-century later, the phrase had a leading
role in the 1981 drama wherein David Stockman was taken to the woodshed by Ron
for telling Washington Post editorialist William Greider that TDE was favored by the
Reaganites.").
221 See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRAcT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923)
("[L]ong run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all
dead.").
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"Some for the Glories of This World, and some Sigh for the
Prophet's Paradise to come; Ah, take the Cash, and let the Credit go,
2 22
Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum!"
Perhaps the antitrust laws embody consumers' desires to keep
their "cash" rather than to trust the "trickle down" economics of the
efficiency view.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The antitrust laws reflect our desire for competition and competitive prices for everyone-buyers as well as sellers. 223 Abandoning the
detour which has asserted that United States antitrust policy is only
concerned with economic efficiency would be the most faithful way to
carry out the intent of Congress. It also would be desirable for policy
reasons, would be as easy to administer as the efficiency view, 224 and
would make United States antitrust more consistent with the views of
2 25
the European competition authorities.
How much difference would it make if antitrust focused on consumer protection objectives instead of-or in addition to-economic
efficiency? In most cases, it would make no difference. If no market
power is created or enhanced by a business practice, there is no allocative inefficiency and no transfer of wealth from consumers to the firms
in question. 226 In these circumstances it would not matter which
approach were used. Conversely, most situations of antitrust concern
222 THE RUBAIYAT OF OMAR KHAYYAM, Verse XIII, at 35 (Edward Fitzgerald trans.,
1898).
223 While this Article has typically focused on the price and effects of anticompetifive conduct, sometimes consumer welfare cannot adequately be protected by antitrust enforcement that only considers price and such closely related areas as cost and
quantity. The "consumer choice" approach is another, more complex way to articulate the goals of the antitrust laws in those situations when non-price issues are at
stake. "Consumer choice" is an emerging paradigm that also is completely economic
in nature. It does incorporate the wealth transfer effects of market power. It also
differs from the efficiency model because it gives greater weight to short term nonprice choices having to do with quality or variety, and also to long term innovation
effects. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice"Approach to

Antitrust Law, 74

ANTITRUST

L.J. 175 (2007).

224 See Fisher & Lande, supra note 58, at 1684-91.
225 The European Competition Commission believes that protecting consumers
from unfair transfers of wealth should be the primary concern of competition law and
that a concern for enhanced economic efficiency should not be allowed to lead to
higher consumer prices. See European Competition Commission, DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses 4, 17-18
(Dec. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrist/art82/
discpaper2005.pdf.
226 See Baxter & Kessler, supra note 173, at 621.
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(such as routine horizontal price fixing) give rise to both allocative

227
inefficiency and a transfer of wealth from purchasers to the cartel.
Cartels, for example, would be condemned under either approach,
228
and it does not matter very much why we condemn them.

But there are some situations involving tradeoffs, and others that
give rise to a wealth transfer but no economic inefficiency, where the
choice among antitrust goals could make a significant difference. For
example, some horizontal mergers that lead to both market power
and cost savings would be handled differently under the efficiency
and the consumer protection standards. 229 Essentially, the market
power effects of the proposed transaction would be given more weight
under an approach whose goal was to prevent consumers from paying
higher prices as a result of the merger than they would be given under
an approach that permitted higher consumer prices so long as the
merger was, on balance, efficient. 230 The wealth transfer approach
would result in stricter merger enforcement, although it is difficult to
23 1
ascertain how many real-world cases would be affected.
A similar tradeoff would arise in any complex potential rule of
reason violation that involved both market power effects and cost savings. 232 For instance, suppose a joint venture gave rise to both cost
savings and increased market power. As with the merger example, it
would be treated more harshly under an approach that sought to prevent prices from rising.
As noted above, similar issues could arise in situations involving
price discrimination. These issues may appear in Robinson-Patman
Act cases, tying cases, and cases challenging discounts used to achieve
exclusive dealing arrangements.2 33 While price discrimination can be
227

See id. at 621-26.

228

See id.

229

See supra note 149 and accompanying text.

230

See Fisher & Lande, supra note 58, at 1624-36, 1670-77.

231

Id.

232 For an analysis of many of the economic issues involved in these situations, see
Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion:FixingPrices, Rivals,
and Rules, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 941, 949-84.
233 See Robert H. Lande, Should Predatory PricingRules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 863, 883; see also European Competition Commission,
supra note 225, at 40 ("Another possible negative effect of rebate systems is price
discrimination between the different buyers."); id. at 54 (referring to price discrimination as an anticompetitive effect of tying arrangements). Commissioner Kovacic
provocatively notes: "It is conceivable that the evaluation of distribution practices
would be influenced more deeply than merger enforcement if a wealth transfer standard gained acceptance." Kovacic, supra note 5, at 1463 n.234.
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efficient or inefficient, depending on the circumstances,23 4 it almost
always causes significant wealth transfer effects. 23 5 To our knowledge,
however, a rigorous analysis of the welfare effects of price discrimination-including consideration of its wealth transfer effects, an analysis

that combined theory and empiricism so that the correct policy solution could be arrived at-has never been performed. 236 What would
happen to conclusions about the empirical balance between the
procompetitive and anticompetitive uses of price discrimination if its
wealth transfer effects also were considered? Professor Hovenkamp
observes: "All forms of persistent price discrimination transfer wealth
away from consumers and toward sellers. If antitrust policy is concerned with such wealth transfers, then price discrimination presents
an antitrust problem. The question is more complex if economic effi237
ciency is not the exclusive goal of the federal antitrust laws."

As this Article has demonstrated, economic efficiency is not the
exclusive goal of the antitrust laws. Rather, Congress made clear that
the fundamental goal is protecting consumers from exploitation.
Congress' principal objective, in other words, was to prevent firms
from acquiring or maintaining market power withoutjustification and
then using that power to raise prices to consumers. In mainstream
antitrust law, there is only one goal in addition to protecting buyers.
When small suppliers are threatened by anticompetitive behavior,
Congress wanted to protect them from exploitation as well, so long as
this could be accomplished without causing purchasers to pay
supracompetitive prices. In both sell-side and buy-side cases, in short,
the ultimate goal is the same-competitive prices (and other terms)
for all. Congress wanted to achieve this goal, moreover, not because it
would enhance economic efficiency, but because it would prevent
powerful firms from unfairly extracting wealth from their trading
partners.
Those who espouse the conventional wisdom have missed this
basic distinction. They have confused the general tendency of anti234

See, e.g.,

HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW

OF

COMPE-

TITION AND ITs PRACTICE 576-78 (3d ed. 2005).

235 Id. at 576. In the case of perfect price discrimination, for example, allocative
efficiency is not harmed but there may be a substantial transfer of wealth from consumers to the discriminating firm. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
236 Another complexity arises from the fact that price discrimination may not
entail only a transfer from consumers to the monopolist. Relative to a single-price
regime, price discrimination could also transfer surplus from consumer group A (e.g.,
low-elasticity consumers, who pay a higher price) to consumer group B (e.g., highelasticity consumers, who pay a lower price). Any analysis of the wealth transfer
effects of price discrimination should also account for this type of effect.
237 HOVENKAMP, supra note 234, at 576; accord Kovacic, supra note 5, at 1463.
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trust law-to promote efficiency-with its ultimate goal. While antitrust enforcement is governed by economic analysis and generally
promotes economic efficiency, it sometimes confronts tradeoffs.
Whenever a tradeoff must be made, neither Congress nor the courts
have ever chosen efficiency over consumer protection. Instead, both
Congress and the courts have indicated that the fundamental purpose
of antitrust law is to protect consumers from exploitation.
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